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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CASE NO. 930667-CA 
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, dba 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., 
JOHN P. CANNON, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
PARTIES 
Defendant John Cannon died in November 1993. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in finding the drill rig had a reasonable market value of 
$97,000? 
2. Did the trial court err in declining to award Showalter damages for speculative lost 
future profits? 
1 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In his "Standard of Appellate Review," Showalter admits, "The trial court found 
[Appellant's] damages ... to be $97,000. It is this finding of the trial court that is the basis of 
this appeal." The Court in Slatterv v. Covev & Co.. Inc.. 857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah App. 1993) 
stated the general standard of review applicable to this appeal: 
An appellant challenging factual findings faces a substantial burden. Trial court's 
findings of fact will be affirmed if they are "based on sufficient evidence, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's construction." In order 
to prevail, "the challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at 
trial which tends to support the findings." That party must then show that these 
same findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them clearly erroneous." The trial court's conclusions of 
law "are accorded no particular deference; we review them for correctness." 
[Citations omitted; emphasis in original] 
The standard is similarly stated in Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989): 
[A] trial court's findings of fact are given deferential review. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) provides, "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). To successfully attack a trial court's 
findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack 
under the rule 52(a) standard. 
The appellate court may affirm the trial court on any proper ground. Weber v. 
Snvderville West. 800 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah App. 1990). The appellate court begins its analysis 
with the trial court's findings of fact, not with the appellant's view of the facts it claims the trial 
court should have found. Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991). If an 
appellant does not properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes the record 
adequately supports the findings of the trial court. The appellate court also implies reasonable 
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unstated findings made by the trial court. Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1993); 
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah App. 1993). 
"[Evaluation of the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence is a matter for the 
trier of fact." Morgan v. Morgan. 854 P.2d 559, 563 (Utah App. 1993). It is the province of 
the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses, and the appellate court will not second-guess 
the trial court where there is a reasonable basis to support its findings. Reed v. Reed. 806 P.2d 
1182, 1184 (Utah 1991). 
The cases Showalter cites in his "Standard of Appellate Review" follow the standards set 
forth above. See Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah App. 1993) ("Findings 
of Fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given the 
opportunity of the Trial Judge to judge the credibility of the witnesses. . . We review the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings and affirm if there is a reasonable 
basis for doing so."); GUlmor v. Gmmor. 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah App. 1987) ("[TJhis Court 
views the evidence and all the inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light most 
supportive of the trial court's findings. ... If there is a reasonable basis in evidence, a trial 
court's award of damages will be affirmed on appeal."). 
PERTINENT STATUTES / REFERENCES 
Utah R.Civ.Proc. 52(a). 
California Business & Professions Code § 7028, § 7031 
California Labor Code § 1020-1024 
23 CAL JUR Damages § 68, § 81 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In or about 1982, Krupp Manufacturing Company in West Germany built a 
prototype drill rig for the government of Czechoslovakia. The truck which carries the drill rig 
was a Czechoslovakian truck. West German export restrictions prevented the sale. Krupp tried 
unsuccessfully for several years thereafter to sell the drill rig on the open market. [R. 236 127; 
Tr. 132, 142-44, 147, 161, 176, 287-289, 293, 477] 
2. The drill rig was a one-of-a-kind prototype drill rig which had not yet been fully 
designed and constructed. It was a demonstrator. The drill rig was overweight, and although 
designed to be self-transportable, could not legally be self-transported on the U.S. Interstate 
highway system. In Europe, it could be driven on roads. Some but not all states might allow 
its self-transportation on non-interstate roads, but transporting the drill rig while avoiding the 
interstate system is problematic. Therefore, transporting the drill rig requires the expense of a 
tractor and lowboy trailer, and special hauling permits. There is no factory support for the drill 
rig, and parts are not available from the manufacturer. At least some of the parts needed to 
repair the drill rig are not commercially available, and would need to be custom manufactured. 
The difficulty in obtaining parts increases both the cost of parts and the down time for repairs. 
There are no factory specifications; this increases the risk that any needed repairs will not be 
adequate. The drill rig was sold without warranty. As a result, the drill rig is less marketable 
than commercially available drill rigs. [R. 219-222, R. 236 1 28; Tr. 136, 160-164, 223-224, 
284-290, 331, 334-335, 391-393, 478] 
3. Krupp originally attempted to sell the drill rig for an asking price of over 
$700,000, but was unable to find any buyers at that price. Krupp got out of the business because 
they could not sell such rigs. At one time Krupp leased the drill rig to a drilling company in 
Germany, who after field testing the drill rig chose not to buy it. In fact, the drill rig had been 
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so used or attempted to be used that it had to be repainted as part of the sale. [R. 220 1 7; Tr. 
145, 161, 199-200] 
4. Stanley Anderson owns a long-established company which performs drilling, and 
also manufactures drill rigs. Krupp offered to sell Anderson the drill rig for $200,000, but 
Anderson was not interested at that price. He might have paid $80,000 if Krupp had offered it 
to him at that price. The drill rig was not durable according to Anderson. Brand-name drill rigs 
with performance features comparable to the Krupp drill rig, but without its disadvantages, are 
commercially available. Anderson sold one such commercially available domestically 
manufactured drill rig on the open market for $200,000. [R. 609, Anderson dep. 5-8, 10, 13] 
5. Krupp then sought the highest price it could get for the drill rig. Krupp offered 
to sell the drill rig to Carl "Pete" Martin for $250,000. Showalter learned Krupp was willing 
to sell the drill rig for $250,000, but Showalter was not interested in buying the drill rig at that 
price. Krupp later dropped the price to $180,000, then to $150,000, then again to $120,000. 
Martin went to West Germany to look the drill rig over. In 1990 Krupp finally sold Martin the 
equipment at a price of $45,000 for the drill rig itself, $35,000 for the carrier truck, and $7,000 
for spare parts and a drill tools kit. Martin also paid $10,000 for customs and shipping charges, 
for a total of $97,000. [Tr. 148, 164, 176-177, 209-210, 397, 446, 474-475; R. 433] 
6. Showalter loaned Martin the money to make the purchase, secured by a 
Promissory Note, Security Agreement and a UCC-1 Financing Statement. In the loan documents 
Showalter placed a value of $97,000 on the drill rig. The mutual intent was that Martin, not 
Showalter, would buy and own the rig, and that Showalter's only interest was to receive 
repayment of his $97,000 loan to Martin. [Tr. 388, 448, 474-75; R. 459, R. 618, Exhibit 51] 
7. Martin and Showalter intended that Martin would pay Showalter off from income 
Martin anticipated making from work using the drill rig. [Tr. 388, 393-394, 467-448] 
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8. During the time Martin owned the drill rig he used it only on a single project 
known as the "Redlands" or "Ladd" project. Showalter was not involved in that project. In 
order to get even that work Martin "bought" the job from another drilling subcontractor, Martin's 
brother, for $40,000. The Redlands project was "a real hard job," and the drill rig could not 
handle the work. Although Martin tried to line up several other potential jobs, he was unable 
to obtain more work for the drill rig. [Tr. 266-267, 390, 393-395, 428-431, 449, R. 431 115] 
9. After Martin took possession of the drill rig from Krupp, Martin (NOT Showalter) 
spent some $12,000 in maintenance, repairs and changes to make the drill rig more serviceable 
to him. Among other things, Martin regeared the rig to slow its drilling speed down to his 
personal preferences. The repair and maintenance included trying to stop leaking hydraulic 
fluids. In fact the leaking continued. [Tr. 152, 225-228, 430-431, 434; R. 431 11 15-16] 
10. Even at a purchase price of $97,000 Martin failed to make enough income from 
the drill rig to pay Showalter, so Showalter took over ownership of the drill rig. [Tr. 199, 335, 
388-389, 474-75] 
11. Showalter wanted to sell the drill rig for what he had invested in it, $97,000, but 
was willing to let Martin try putting it to work in the meantime. [Tr. 474-475, 479-480; R. 431 
117] 
12. Showalter never received any offers to buy the drill rig. [Tr. 481-482; R. 431 1 
19] 
13. In 1991 Showalter employed Martin to work the drill rig on a contract with 
Cannon in Kayenta, Arizona, which was again referred from Martin*s brother. This was the one 
and only job on which Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling used the drill rig. Prior to that 
time, Mr. Martin had used it on the Ladd or Redlands job. [Tr. 19, 229, 450, 460-461, 481] 
14. Showalter's business was new and not well established. [R. 431 1 20] 
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15. Showalter never made any profit doing business as Rocky Mountain Drilling. In 
over one and one-half years the drill rig was available to Showalter, he continuously lost money 
on the rig. Rocky Mountain Drilling's expenses always exceeded its income. Showalter 
speculated on what "could" happen in the future. He did not rent a drill rig or even attempt to 
rent a drill rig after the accident. [Tr. 462-464, 475-476, 480-481; R. 431 1 18] 
16. In early December of 1991, Cannon contracted with Showalter to transport the 
drill rig from Kayenta, Arizona to a road under construction in California, for which Showalter 
d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling had a drilling subcontract with Coast-Geo Construction Co. 
Showalter saw only the final page of his 13-page contract, and has no knowledge of the contents 
of the first twelve pages. Although the contract provided, H All work on a rental/hourly basis not 
to exceed $47,880,M Showalter did not know what his contractual hourly rate was. Showalter 
had no contractor's license in California, and was barred by California statute from contracting 
or collecting for work using the drill rig without a license. [R. 432 f 3; Tr. 465-468] 
Hvdrotechv. Oasis, 803 P.2d 370 (CA 1991); Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons. 308 P.2d 713 
(CA 1959); California Business & Professions Code § 7028, § 7031; California Labor Code § 
1020-1024, all included herein. [See also, Tr. 498-500] 
17. While transporting the drill rig, Cannon lost the drill rig down a canyon, damaging 
the drill rig. [R. 431 1 13; R. 236 1 25] 
18. As of early 1992, Cannon thought the rig could be repaired for about $100,000. 
[R. 236 13l ;Tr . 84-89, 100] 
19. Showalter filed suit against Cannon, claiming damages to the rig of approximately 
$1,000,000. [R. 1] 
20. Cannon decided to begin making repairs to the drill rig in an attempt to mitigate 
potential losses. [Tr. 90-92] Showalter believed the rig was beyond repair. [Tr. 156] 
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21. Cannon ultimately spent some $321,000 in remanufacturing domestic replacement 
parts for the drill rig, [Tr. 103] creating a new rig, not a used rig, [R. 609, Anderson deposition, 
page 24] but did not complete the repairs in a sufficient manner to be able to make acceptable 
tender of a fully repaired drill rig to Plaintiff [R. 430 1 23] 
22. Showalter designated Jerry Rice, an expert in the value of drill rigs, to testify. 
[R. 313] Showalter did not call his expert witness to testify at trial. [Tr. 1-547] 
23. For the value of the damage drill rig, Showalter presented the testimony of Martin 
and of Joe Carl, who are longtime close personal friends and acquaintances of Showalter, and 
of Showalter himself. Mr. Carl coordinated the purchase of the rig by Plaintiff for $97,000 and 
accompanied Showalter to inspect the damaged rig. Mr. Carl had been out of the business since 
1986, and was not familiar with today's prices. Their testimony was not founded on personal 
knowledge as to the actual reasonable market value of the drill rig, but on the cost to buy a 
production model replacement without the disadvantages of this particular rig. [R. 239 12, R. 
433 1 1; Tr. 144, 148-149, 153, 159-162, 177, 192 lines 23-24, 199, 477, 483, See Facts 1-4 
above] 
24. At trial, counsel for Cannon objected to Exhibit 47. The trial court sustained the 
objection, and excluded Exhibit 47 from evidence. Showalter has not raised the trial court's 
evidentiary ruling as an issue on appeal. [Tr. 368-369, 469-471] The appellate court should 
disregard all attempts by Showalter to bolster his argument by referring to "facts" found only in 
Exhibit 47, which is not part of the record either at trial or on appeal. 25. The trial 
court found Cannon to be 100 percent at fault in losing the drill rig down the canyon. [R. 430 
11 2 and 5] 
26. An expert witness skilled in pricing of rigs and accepted by Showalter as being 
"an economic rig expert," testified $97,000 was the fair market value of the drill rig at the time 
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of sale, and $62,250 was the fair market value of the drill rig at the time of the accident. [Tr. 
282-294, 320; R. 617 Exhibit 43 included herein] Showalter depreciated the value four times 
as quickly as the expert. [Tr. 401] 
27. The trial court found the damages to the drill rig amounted to a total loss of the 
drill rig, and awarded Showalter damages of $97,000. [R. 431-429] This is the same value 
Showalter placed on the drill rig. [Facts 6 and 11 above] 
28. Because the trial court found the drill rig was a total loss and awarded the full 
reasonable market value of the drill rig to Showalter, the trial court awarded the salvage of the 
drill rig to Cannon. [R. 557-558] 
29. Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling had done only one job using the drill 
rig, and had never shown a profit. The trial court found Showalter's business was new and not 
well established. It concluded Showalter's claim for lost profits was too speculative for recovery. 
[Facts 14-16 above; R. 431-429] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court found the reasonable market value of the drill rig was $97,000, equivalent 
to the purchase price (R. 43 M 21). This is the value placed by Plaintiff/Appellant before the 
accident occurred. It is higher than the $80,000 another potential purchaser was willing to pay 
and higher than the $62,500 value placed on it by an expert evaluation, the only independent 
expert evaluation in evidence. Plaintiff/Appellant presented no evidence of market value ~ the 
proper measure of damages. Only Plaintiff/Appellant, Plaintiff/Appellant's agent and co-
purchaser Mr. Martin, and their close friend, Mr. Carl, gave opinions as to what the rig might 
be "worth/ 
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The trial court also found Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling's business was new 
and unestablished, and concluded his claim for lost future profits was speculative. This finding 
is also supported by the unchallenged substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff/Appellant 
admits he never made any money in his business, "his costs being greater than his income/ 
"From April of 1990 to December of 1991 plaintiff attempted to use the rig on several 
construction projects. Most of the projects fell through, but plaintiff was able to obtain work on 
two projects. Plaintiff paid $40,000 to another company to obtain the other company's right to 
the work." [R. 431 1 15-20] The trial court's legal conclusions result from the proper 
application of the law to those facts. This Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING ON THE VALUE OF THE DRILL RIG 
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
This action is governed by California law. The measure of recovery for destruction of 
personal property is as follows: 
The proper measure of damages for the complete destruction of personal 
property is the reasonable market value of the property destroyed. Neither the 
cost of the property nor the expense of replacing it is the proper measure. 
23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 68; Tatone v. Chin Bing. 55 P.2d 933 (Cal. App. 1936), included 
herein. The rule is similarly stated in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Mounteer. 136 Cal.Rptr. 280, 
281 (Cal. App. 1977): 
The general rule is that the measure of damages for tortious injury to personal 
property is the difference between the market value of the property immediately 
before and immediately after the injury, or the reasonable cost of repair if that 
cost be less than the diminution in value. 
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Utah applies the same measure of damages. See Winters v. Charles Anthony. Inc.. 586 P.2d 
453, 454 (Utah 1978): 
The general rule is that damages awarded for personal property that is 
taken or destroyed are based on the item's market value at the time of the taking 
or destruction. Ordinarily, market value is defined as the price for which an 
article is bought and sold and for which there exists a demand in the market place, 
and the legal definition of that price is retail, not wholesale. 
The trial court's damage award is based on the following Finding of Fact: 
21. Plaintiff has been damaged as follows: 
a. For the total loss of the subject drill rig having a value of $97,000 
(purchase price plus customs and shipping costs). 
From this Finding of Fact, the trial court made the following Conclusion of Law: 
4. Plaintiff has sustained general damages for the value of the drill rig 
in the sum of $97,000. [R. 431-430] 
Appellant has failed to "marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to 
support the findings," and to "show that these same findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.'" Slattery. supra. 
Appellant's argument that "The base purchase price and the customs charge is all of the evidence 
that can be found to support the trial court's finding of damages" only demonstrates Showalter's 
conscious disregard of the proper standard and supporting evidence. The price of the only sale 
of the rig is sufficient to support the court findings. Slattery. supra.; Rembold, supra., Tatone, 
supra. The additional evidence at trial and reasonable inference in support of the trial court's 
findings included the following: 
Krupp Manufacturing Co. built the drill rig in West Germany in or about 1982. The drill 
rig was a one-of-a-kind prototype built for the Czechoslovakian government, and its design still 
had not been completely worked out at the time of sale. While the drill rig had some desirable 
features, it had many characteristics which adversely affected its marketability. Commercially 
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available brand-name drill rigs with comparable performance features, but without the 
disadvantages of the Krupp drill rig, could be purchased on the open market for $200,000. 
[Cannon Facts 1-4]1 
Krupp sought the highest price it could get for the drill rig on the open market. It tried 
to market the drill rig with an asking price of over $700,000, but found no buyers at that price. 
It once leased the drill rig, but after using the drill rig in the field the lessee chose not to buy it. 
Krupp dropped its asking price to $250,000, then to $180,000, then to $150,000, then to 
$120,000, before it was finally able to find a buyer in Martin for $87,000, plus customs and 
shipping charges. [Cannon Facts 3-5] 
Showalter learned Krupp was asking $250,000 for the drill rig, but was not interested in 
buying the drill rig at that price. [Cannon Fact 5] 
One other potential buyer of the drill rig might have been willing to pay $80,000 for the 
drill rig, but was not willing to pay $200,000. [Cannon Fact 4] 
Showalter eventually loaned Martin $97,000 to buy the drill rig. [Cannon Fact 6] 
After Martin bought the drill rig Martin (NOT Showalter) did some maintenance, repair 
and modification work to the drill rig, at a cost of about $12,000. [Cannon Fact 9] There is no 
evidence this maintenance expense had any effect on the reasonable market value of the drill rig, 
and the trial court was within its discretion in excluding this repair expense from the value of the 
drill rig. 
Martin could not make enough money from the drill rig to pay Showalter off, so 
Showalter took possession of the drill rig. Showalter intended to sell the drill rig to recover his 
$97,000, but never received any offers for the drill rig. [Cannon Facts 8-12] 
lM
 Cannon Facts" refer to the statements of fact and citations contained in the 
STATEMENT OF FACTS beginning at page 4 of this brief. 
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At trial, one expert witness testified the fair market value of the drill rig was $97,000 at 
the time of purchase from Krupp, and the fair market value of the drill rig at the time of the 
accident was $62,250. [Cannon Fact 26] Showalter designated another expert witness to testify 
at trial as to the drill rig's value, but did not call that witness at trial. [Cannon Fact 22] The 
trial court could reasonably have inferred that expert's testimony would have been unfavorable 
to Showalter. 
Showalter's so-called "overwhelming evidence" of a high value for the drill rig came from 
the testimony of Martin and of Joe Carl, who are longtime close personal friends and 
acquaintances of Showalter, and from Showalter himself. Mr. Carl had been out of the business 
since 1986. Mr. Carl was not familiar with today's prices. Their testimony was not founded 
on personal knowledge as to the actual reasonable market value of the drill rig. [Cannon Fact 
23] 
The only sale on which to assess the value of the drill rig was the sale to Martin at a total 
cost of $97,000. Although Showalter apparently wanted to sell the drill rig, neither Showalter 
nor Martin ever received any offers, for $600,000 or any similar amount. At most, testimony 
of a value around $600,000 was speculation as to replacement cost, not reasonable market value. 
Replacement cost is not the proper measure of damages, 23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 68, supra., 
particularly of a one-of-a-kind prototype that could not be self-transporting because it was 10,000 
pounds over its design weight. The trial court had the opportunity to consider the demeanor and 
bias of Showalter's witnesses in assessing their credibility, and was within its discretion in giving 
greater credence to the evidence supporting the trial court's finding. 
Cannon spent a substantial amount to repair the drill rig, not because he thought the rig 
was worth any particular amount, but because Showalter had sued Cannon for $1,000,000, there 
was a genuine issue as to the actual value of the rig, Cannon thought the rig could be repaired 
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for $100,000, and he wanted to mitigate any potential losses. [Cannon Facts 18-21] It is 
probable that the remanufactured rig is worth more than the original, because it has been 
Americanized and all the used parts are now new. 
No buyer was ever willing to pay $600,000, or $425,000, or even $180,000, for the drill 
rig. Showalter himself was not willing to pay $250,000 when Krupp offered the drill rig at that 
price. Rather, the evidence shows that $200,000 (NOT $600,000) may have been the 
approximate value of a domestically manufactured commercially available brand-name drill rig 
with comparable performance features but with none of the disadvantages of the Czech designed 
Krupp drill rig. The cost of replacing the used, prototype Krupp drill rig with a new, different, 
commercially drill rig is not the proper measure of damages, nor is the cost of remanufacturing 
a prototype the proper measure. 23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 68. The trial court was within its 
discretion in weighing the evidence as a whole and in rejecting $600,000 as the reasonable 
market value of the drill rig at the time of the accident. 
w[M]arket value is defined as the price for which an article is bought and sold and for 
which there exists a demand in the market place.w Winters, supra. The evidence showed a 
demand for the drill rig in the marketplace, at a price around $80,000, not $200,000 and 
certainly not $600,000. $97,000, which includes $7,000 for parts and $10,000 for customs and 
shipping charges, is the maximum amount for which the drill rig was ever bought and sold. That 
price was reached through arms-length negotiations between a willing buyer and a willing seller. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, the trial 
court's finding that the drill rig had a fair market value of $97,000 is well supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. Showalter1 s appeal on this issue is without merit. The trial 
court's judgment should be affirmed. 
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H. THE TRIAL COURTfS DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S LOST 
PROFIT CLAIM AS SPECULATIVE IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Lost future profits which are uncertain, speculative or remote are not recoverable: 
Damages for loss of profits, whether for commission of a tort or breach 
of a contract, may not be recovered where such profits are uncertain, speculative, 
or remote. 
23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 80. A well established business may have a "track record" of 
historically provable profits from which lost future profits may be established. In contrast, 
because a new or unestablished business has no such track record, lost profits from a new 
business are not susceptible of reasonable proof, and are too speculative to justify recovery. 
Without a historical record of profit-making, there is no basis from which to conclude that the 
new business would make any profit at all: 
In allowing damages for loss of profits due to an injury to a business, 
either by breach of a contract or commission of a tort, the law makes a distinction 
between established and new business, in keeping with the general rule that such 
damages, in order to be recoverable, must be reasonably certain and not 
speculative or remote. . . . When the operation of an established business is 
prevented or interrupted, either by a tort or a breach of contract, damages for loss 
of prospective profits that might otherwise have been earned from operation of the 
business are ordinarily recoverable since their occurrence and extent may be 
ascertained with reasonable certainty from the working experience of the business, 
from the past volume of business, and other provable data relevant to the probable 
future sales of the business. 
A loss of prospective profits from an unestablished business, either from 
a breach of contract or the commission of a tort, is considered too uncertain to 
merit compensation. A new business, in contradistinction to an established 
concern, is regarded in law as simply an adventure, which presents a mere 
possibility of earning future profits, and the courts will not, obviously, presume 
that the profits anticipated from its commencement will actually be realized by the 
parties to the venture. If one engages in a new industry, there are no provable 
data of past business from which the fact can be legally deduced that anticipated 
profits would have been realized. 
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23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 81 [emphasis added]. See MacMorris Sales Corp. v. Kozak. 69 Cal 
Rptr. 719, 726 (Ct. App. 1968) ("Generally if a business is new it is not proper to give damages 
for loss of prospective profits/) 
The trial court's decision not to award Plaintiff damages for lost future profits is based 
on the following Findings of Fact: 
15. From April of 1990 to December of 1991 plaintiff attempted to use 
the rig on several construction projects. Most of the projects fell through, but 
plaintiff was able to obtain work on two projects. Plaintiff paid $40,000 to 
another company to obtain the other company's right to the work. 
18. Plaintiff never made any money from the rig, his costs being 
greater than his income. 
20. Plaintiffs business was new and not well established. 
From these Findings of Fact, the trial court made the following Conclusion of Law: 
3. Having found that plaintiffs business is new and unestablished, the 
court concludes that plaintiffs business losses are too speculative for recovery: 
In allowing damages for loss of profits due to an injury to a 
business, either by breach of a contract or commission of a tort, 
the law makes a distinction between established and new business, 
in keeping with the general rule that such damages, in order to be 
recoverable, must be reasonably certain and not speculative or 
remote. . . . 
A loss of prospective profits from an unestablished business, 
either from a breach of contract or from the commission of a tort, 
is considered too uncertain to merit compensation. 
23 CAL. JUR. Damages 81 (citations omitted). (R. 431-430) 
Evidence at trial supporting the trial court's findings on this issue included the following: 
Rocky Mountain Drilling had performed only one contract in its entire existence, had 
always operated at a loss, and had no immediate expectation of acquiring more work or ever 
making a profit. Showalter did not even intend to stay in business, but intended to dispose of 
the drill rig at the first available opportunity. [Cannon Facts 8, 10, 13 and 15] 
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Martin was supposedly experienced in the drilling industry. However, during the one and 
one-half years he owned the drilling rig, Martin was only able to find work on one project where 
he used the drill rig, and even that job had to be bought from his brother. Showalter was not 
even involved in that project. The job was more difficult that Martin had expected, and the drill 
rig was not ready to handle the work. Although Martin tried to line up several other potential 
jobs, he was unable to obtain more work for the drill rig. Martin was unable to generate 
sufficient income from the use of the drill rig to pay off, or even make payments, on his 
$97,000 loan from Showalter. [Cannon Facts 8-10] 
Showalter acquired the rig by loaning Martin the money to buy the drill rig, then taking 
possession of the drill rig pursuant to his rights as a secured creditor when Martin, because of 
his inability to make a profit, defaulted on his loan payments. Showalter did not acquire the drill 
rig to use it on construction projects. Showalter wanted to sell the rig, but never received any 
offers to buy the rig. [Cannon Facts 6, 10-12] The trial court's decision that the fair market 
value of the drill rig was $97,000 is supportable. Point I, supra. It is reasonable to infer 
Showalter would not have profited from the sale of the drill rig more than he was already 
awarded. 
Rocky Mountain Drilling used the drill rig on only one project. Showalter's argument 
he made "a healthy profitw on that job is particularly surprising in light of Showalter's actual 
testimony that he never made any profits as Rocky Mountain Drilling. During the time the drill 
rig was available to Showalter, his expenses exceeded his income, and he lost money on the drill 
rig. [Cannon Facts 13-15] 
Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling had only one other contract lined up, to use the 
drilling rig on a road project in California "on a rental/hourly basis not to exceed $47,880." 
Showalter saw only the final page of his 13-page contract, and has no knowledge of his 
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obligations contained in the first 12 pages of his contract. Showalter does not even know what 
his contractual hourly rate was. Only the final page of that contract is in evidence, and it would 
be nothing more than guesswork whether the terms of that contract, which are not in evidence 
and unknown even to Showalter, would have allowed Showalter to make a profit by performing 
the contract. [Cannon Fact 16] 
While Showalter gave his opinion as to what he anticipated in the way of future profits, 
his opinion had no basis in any historical track record. Among other things Showalter1 s opinion 
also assumed Showalter would obtain and profit from future work he had not yet even bid on, 
yet alone been awarded contracts for. The trial court was within its discretion to disregard 
Showalter1 s opinion as based on speculation. 
Showalter had no California contractor's license. Showalter was prohibited by California 
statute from entering into the contract or collecting on the contract. [Cannon Fact 16] Any 
claim Showalter would have made a profit on that job is pure speculation. There is no evidence 
Showalter would ever have been awarded another construction contract, or make a profit if a 
contract was awarded. Most past projects had fallen through. [Cannon Fact 8] Any finding of 
future profit would be based on speculation. 
It was within the discretion of the trial court to disregard Showalter*s claims regarding 
lost future profits as lacking in credibility, and as being to uncertain, speculative and remote. 
The trial court's finding that Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling was a new and 
unestablished business has ample support in the record. The trial court's conclusion that 
Showalter*s claim for lost profits is speculative is also amply supported by the evidence, and 
results from a proper application of the law to the facts. This Court should affirm the trial 
court's decision not to award Showalter lost future profits. 
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CONCLUSION 
Showalterfs appeal is a head-on challenge to the trial court's findings of fact. He asks 
this Court to substitute his view of the evidence for the trial court's findings. Showalter has 
ignored both the standard of review and his burden of proof on appeal: 
An appellant challenging factual findings faces a substantial burden. Trial court's 
findings of fact will be affirmed if they are "based on sufficient evidence, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's construction." In order 
to prevail, "the challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at 
trial which tends to support the findings." That party must then show that these 
same findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them clearly erroneous." 
Siattery, supra. 
The findings on the fair market value of the drill rig and the speculative nature of 
Showalter's lost profits claim are amply supported by evidence in the record. This Court should 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
DATED this 2V day of January, 1994. 
^ttqflneys for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the of January, 1994 I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
LONI F. DeLAND, #0862 
McRAE & DeLAND 
72 East 400 South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 364-1333 
BRUCE L. DAWSON, #6205 
560 South 1200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 583-1077 
I CAHIBIT _ * 
W.7NESS If&rf*--
| CARtLEE DUST1N. RPR/NOTARY 
C o n t r a c t 
Between 
Mr Carl (Pete) Martin 
2985 West, 1820 South 
Vernal/ Utah 84078 USA 
Telephone 801 789 7223 
on t h e one side 
and 
Krupp Maschinentechnik GmbH 
HelenenstraBe 149 
4300 Essen Germany 
t h e fol lowing contract has been concluded: 
1. Mr. Martin has bought and Krupp has so ld a demonstrator 
Krupp D r i l l i n g Machine KDM 12-150 
a s inspected at Krupp's premises. Mr. Martin i s aware of 
t h e f a c t tha t t h i s u n i t i s a one of a kind machine. 
The p r i c e i s US Dol la rs 45.000,- ( fo r ty f ive thousand) 
2. Furthermore Mr Martin has bought and Krupp has sold the 
c a r r i e r truck of the type 
Ta t ra 813 - 8 x 8 . 
a l s o as inspected 
The p r i c e i s US Dol la r s 35,000,- ( t h i r t y f i v e thousand) 
3 . Furthermore Mr. Martin has bought and Krupp has so ld the 
fol lowing d r i l l i n g t o o l s and spare p a r t s : 
one auger 
one auger 
one rock auger 
one bucket 
one bucket 
one core ba r r e l 
one core b a r r e l 
two cut t ing r i n g s 
600 mm dia . 
800 mm dia . 
500 mm dia . 
600 mm dia . 
800 mm dia . 
850 mm dia . 
870 mm dia . 
880 mm d ia . 
two reamers for 3.600 mm dia . 
one pushing (in and out) cylinder 
one rotary gear box 
four s l id ing pads 
The p r i c e is US Dol la r s 7.000,- (seven thousand) / JTS55IT" - • • • 
I * DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
-3£L f) I f,/fr 
Annex 1 to the contract between Mr. Martin and Krupp 
Maschinentechnik dated January 10th 1990. 
Specimen for the text of a letter of credit. 
• 
By order and for account of ve hereby issue our 
irrevocable Documentary Credit No in favour of Krupp 
for DM (fob value) valid until in West 
Germany available at sight as follows: 
100% of the fob value amounting to DM is 
payable against presentation of the following 
documents: 
Commercial invoice signed by Seller in ....copies 
Full set of Bill of Lading made out to freight 
prepaid notify address ...... 
or Forwarders Certificate of Receipt 
Insurance Certificate in duplicate 
Suppliers declaration 
Covering shipment of 1 KDMdrilling machine plus accessories on 
fob basis from West Germany to by ship 
Part shipment: allowed 
Transshipment: allowed 
Please advise beneficiary of the opening of this credit adding 
your confirmation. 
This credit is subject to the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits (1983 Revision), International Chamber of 
Commerce Publication No. 400. 
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4. On all the Items listed above under 1. to 3. any warranty 
and any other claims whatsoever are excluded. 
5. The prices have to be understood fob Horthsea port 
according to INCOTERMS as per issue 1980. 
The items under 3. above shall be packed seaworthy. 
6. The payment will be effected by means of an irrevocable 
letter of credit in the favour of Krupp being issued 
immediately upon return of Mr Martin to the USA - latest 
however until January 25th 1990 - with a validity until 
February 28. 1990. Krupp has handed out a specimen text of 
a letter of credit as Annex 1. Mr Martin shall, ask his bank 
to release the text of the L/C to Krupp by telefax. 
The following documents shall be presented for the 
remittance of the L/C: 
One commercial invoice plus two copies each for the 
items or group of items listed under 1. to 3. 
Complete set of clean on board ocean bills of lading 
consigned to the order of Mr. Martin . Notify 
Valsco, Drilling Equipment Supplies, 
12929 Telegraph Road 
Santa Fe Springs, Calif. 90670 
For customs clearance evidencing shipment from West 
Germany to Los Angeles/USA. 
Bills of lading to be marked "freight collect11. 
Suppliers declaration. 
Upon presentation of the documents the above amount shall 
be payable unconditionally. 
Krupp shall paint the KDM anew as soon as the L/C has been 
received by Krupp. 
colours: carrier truck black 
KDM body orange 
KDM mast white 
Immediately upon finalization of the painting the KDM as 
veil as the other items will be shipped to the Northsea 
port still to be selected. 
Mr Martin shall instruct Krupp as soon as possible about 
the details for the ocean shipment to enable both parties 
to arrange for a smooth transportation. 
/ at 
•3 
9. Title and property shall be transferred to Mr Martin for 
the above items as soon as the amounts as per 1. to 3. have 
been credited to one of Krupp's bank accounts. 
.This contract has been duly signed in the presence of two 
witnesses in Essen, Germany on the tenth day of January 
nineteen hundred and ninety. 
for 
<Carl (Pete) Martin> 
p Maschinentechnik: 
,\t/flucM^r: 
oene> <Peter Drescher> 
Witnesses: 
CS 
<Dr. i t e /a ld Zierul> 
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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 6, 1991, a truck-mounted Krupp Drilling Machine (KDM unit) was being 
driven to a site near San Simeon, California After the driver failed to negotiate a curve, 
the KDM unit rolled over and down a slope. 
On November 10,1992, the Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. was retained to determine the 
value of the KDM unit at the time of the accident and other information germane to the 
accident. 
Our report is based on the information available to us at this time, as described in 
Section IV, BASIS OF REPORT. Should additional information become available, we 
reserve the right to determine the impact, if any, of the new information on our opinions 
and conclusions, and to revise our opinions and conclusions if necessary and warranted 
by the discovery of additional information. 
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SECTION n 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In conducting our investigation, we formed the following opinions: 
1. The KDM unit was a prototype model and foreign made 
which greatly diminishes its value when comparing it to a 
commercial model of domestic manufacture. 
2. The value of the KDM unit depreciated between the time of 
purchase and the time of the accident. 
3. Such depreciation is in the range of 20 to 30 percent. The 
residual value at the time of the accident is approximately 
$62,250, based on an initial purchase price of $87,000. 
4. The KDM drilling unit was purchased from Krupp at a 
significant discount due to the following factors: 
a) It was sold as a one-of-a-kind prototype and 
was never put into regular production. 
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b) It was sold as a demonstrator and was not 
considered as a new piece of equipment. 
c) It was assembled to the specifications of an 
eastern European government, which diminished 
its value to other customers. 
d) The construction, oil, and gas industries (which 
were the primary markets for such units in the 
United States) were depressed, causing a 
surplus of existing equipment and a lack of 
demand for new units. 
5. We have seen no evidence that the KDM unit was road 
tested for the United States market. Also no evidence has 
been provided to confirm that the KDM unit was checked for 
U.S. transportation requirements. Such deficiencies could 




The original purchase price of the KDM unit was $87,000, which included $45,000 for the 
drilling assembly, $35,000 for the truck carrier, and $7,000 for spare parts. We normally 
consider used equipment sales prices if an orderly market exists. The KDM unit under 
investigation is a one-of-a-kind, foreign-made prototype. The only sale price that is 
valid is the original sale price. Under these circumstances, figuring depreciation is an 
approximation as some components of the KDM unit were as much as seven years old 
at the time of the Martin purchase, January 10,1990. Also, some of the parts and the 
spare parts are consumable and would have been used up or at least depleted by the 
time of the accident on December 6,1991. 
From a tax standpoint, domestic units are usually depreciated out over a period of 10 to 
15 years. The unit was approaching two years of age since the original Martin purchase. 
From a practical standpoint, annual depreciation is figured in the range of 7 to 10 percent 
per annum and drive-off depreciation is in the same range. This puts total depreciation 
in the range of 20 to 30 percent. For our calculation, we picked a mid-range number of 
25 percent depreciation. 
During on or around the period from November 28, 1990 to January 7, 1992, certain 
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repairs were made on the KDM unit. The invoice for this work was $12,908.90, of which 
$12,420 was for labor. Much of this is described as maintenance, such as repair weld, 
adjust brakes, derrick, cable rollers, kelly bar, reweld chain covers, repair filter leaks, tank 
leaks, and miscellaneous leaks. At least some of this work appears to be for disassembly 
of the chain and sprocket gears, machine modification to change gear ratio, and 
reassembly of the unit. Based on this invoice and testimony we have reviewed regarding 
this work, we see no reason to believe that it has significantly altered the value of the 
KDM unit. Much of the work was normal maintenance and the rest was to reduce 
rotational speed. 
The KDM drilling unit was a one of a kind prototype that never reached regular 
production. This means that it was an experimental and developmental model. With 
such a model, there are design and production problems that have to be worked out. 
According to Mr. Carl's testimony, Krupp was in this process when they decided to cease 
development of the unit. Based on the testimony of Mr. Carl and Mr. Martin, the market 
would not bear the price Krupp would need for such a unit. A problem with this prototype 
is that it has not gone through the debugging process (where design and production kinks 
or problems are worked out) that a regular production model is subjected to. The owner 
or operator of such a developmental prototype is likely to experience problems that would 
normally be eliminated by the debugging process. The fact that the debugging phase 
was not completed greatly diminishes the value to a knowledgeable purchaser. Such a 
unit can be a liability at any price. The factors mentioned in conclusion numbers one and 
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four are the reasons that the KDM unit sold at the price that it did in 1990 and would also 
adversely affect its value at the time of the accident. 
According to testimony from Mr. Showalter, the KDM unit was originally built for the 
government of Czechoslovakia. Also according to his testimony, the Czechs sent the 
truck to Krupp and that is why it is on a Czech truck. Mr. Showalter also mentions 
transportation problems once the KDM unit reached California According to his 
testimony the KDM unit was 9,000 to 10,000 pounds overweight based on its length. This 
was 10,000 pounds heavier than it was supposed to be, based on the numbers Krupp 
supplied with purchase documents. The weight error is unaccounted for but could be a 
result of the prototype debugging process. Pre-production improvement usually 
increases weight, and these changes tend to be cumulative. We do not know if the 
knowledge of weight problems was passed on to Mr. Cannon (the driver at the time of 
the accident or other drivers. 
The KDM unit was equipped with a dual pinion drive. In lay terms, this means that power 
was supplied to the kelly (a square or angular bar that transmits rotation to the drilling 
assembly) from both sides rather than only one side. The primary advantages of the dual 
drive are that it is more rugged and is less prone to vibration. This will allow for some 
increase in penetration with some soils and conditions. The trade-off is higher cost and 
reduced portability due to increased weight. 
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We have seen no evidence that the KDM unit was road tested. This could be a problem 
knowing that the truck was provided by a foreign country (Czechoslovakia) for a foreign 
company (Krupp in West Germany) with the intention that it would be returned to 
Czechoslovakia. Based on the problems encountered in California (the initial weight 
problems noted by Showalter and the accident), the knowledge that the unit was not 
originally intended for the United States market, and the fact that it was a prototype, we 
question if it was road tested or checked to see if U.S. transportation requirements were 
met. Failure to meet these requirements could have been a factor in the accident. 
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SECTION IV 
BASIS OF REPORT 
In conducting our investigation, we performed the following work and reviewed the 
following documentation: 
1. Sales agreements between Carl (Pete) Martin and Krupp 
Maschinentechnik GmbH, and Carl D. Martin and Robert D. 
Showalter. 
2. Truck documents provided to Lynn Larsen by Bob McRae. 
These documents include the following: 
a) Loan description to Martin from Showalter 
b) Sales contract between Martin and Krupp. 
c) Security agreement between Martin and 
Showalter. 
d) VCC-1 financing statement Martin and 
Showalter. 
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e) Secured promissory notes Martin and Showalter. 
f) Description, truck carrier, parts, and service 
manual. 
g) Krupp invoices on KDM unit, #94131, #94132, 
and #94133. 
h) Weight ticket. 
i) Truck permit. 
j) Quote on Kelly crowd. 
k) Packing certificate. 
0 Delivery tickets. 
m) Repair invoice. 
n) EPA clean air act notice. 
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Conversation with John Cannon. This was a general 
conservation with regard to a description of the KDM unit and 
a description of its use leading up to the accident, as noted 
in the introduction. 
Deposition of Carl D. Martin. 
Deposition of Robert D. Showalter. 
Deposition of Joseph Carl. 
Deposition of Stanley Anderson. 
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SECTION IV 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
Several areas noted as follows are to be considered for additional development. 
We have seen no evidence that the prototype KDM unit was road tested 
for the U.S. market or otherwise designed in accordance with D.O.T. 
regulations. If these tests and requirements were completed, we 
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SEC U Fl T y A G R E E M E N T 
Agreement ric'e t h i s ?1 day of Feb 1981, 
betweencarl n and/or Lori Lynn MSAvn Vernal c i t V 
of Vernal county of Ujntah s t a t e of n ^ . here in 
r e f e r r e d to as debtor, and 
..Rnhprt R. anriior Monta Rae Showaltor herein referred t o as 
secured p a r t i e s . 
In considerat ion of the mutual covenants and promises set 
f o r t h here in the debtor and secured p a r t y as fo l lows: 
CREATION OF SECURITY INTEREST 
Debtor hereby grants to secured par ty a secur i ty i n t e r e s t i n 
the c o l l a t e r a l described i n s e c t i o n two of t h i s agreement, t o 
secure the performance and payment of the fol lowing described 
note; jj
 and> j2 _ _ 
and all costs end expenses incurred by secured party in the 
collection and enforcement of the note and other indebtedness of 
debtor. 
DESCRIPTION 0 p COLLATERAL 
The collateral of this security agreement, herein referred 
to as ccllstsrel consists of: Drilling Rig 
Inventory end accounts receivable wheather now owned or hereafter 
ais-'iref. Inducing all proceeds arising there from wheather in 
tKe fcrm of accounts oK other wise both tangible or intangible. 
PEPTG**S OELIGATIQV, GENERALLY 
<a) Fa/rent. Debtor shall pay to secured party the sum 
e-/i csr.ee t, ths above msr-ticne* note or any renewals of 
e::te.nsicns thereof e^ .cuted pursuant to this security agreement in 
accordarcs with the terrs of such note. 
<t) Warranties and representations. Debtor warrants and 
covenants that: 
1. The e are nc set crfs or counter claims of any 
rr.i'-s ara:r-st the Irventcry or Arcc-jr-tf receivable. 
2. Thr i-.srtc-y a-.f. azro.nts receivable are free 
. . — * — £ ' - . a: r e n t e ^ e r a i v a b l e w i l l not be 
-£••!•€£ zz a n / f c^ac - other t h a t s,ezvred 
f i s - c e r t t : * a z .* a r ; r * - t * . 
• - 1 * - * £ • •. c' t cr-fanc1 i n v e n t o r y and, 
r\ t u r l£ ^ . : c ! £ l n and der^nds o f £ 11 
p e r s e n s . 
FINANCING STATEMENT 
At the request o f s e c u r e d p a r t y , deb tor w i l l j o i n i n 
e x e c u t i n g or w i l l e x e c u t e , as a p p r o p r i a t e , a l l n e c e s s a r y 
f i n a n c i n g stctercents i n a fo rm s a t i s f a c t o r y t o s e c u r e d p a r t y and 
w i l l psy the ccst o f f i l i n g cush s t a t e m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g a l l 
s t a t u t o r y f e e s . Debtor w a r r a n t s t h a t no f i n a n c i n g s t a t e m e n t 
c o v e r i n g t h e c o l l a t e r a l or any p a r t t h e r e o f o r any p r o c e e d s 
t h e r e o f i s p r e s e n t l y on f i l e i n any p u b l i c o f f i c e . 
DEFAULT 
If debtor frils to pay when due any amount payable on the 
above-cautioned note or any other indebtedness of debtor, secured 
ty this agreement or fails to observe or perform any of the 
previsions of this agreement debtor shall be in default* 
REMEDIES 
CT: c r v dsfs-. I t by d e b t o r , end a t any t i m e t h e r e a f t e r , 
s e c u r e d fs*"ty r.*y d e c l a r e a l l o b l i g a t i o n s secured by t h i s 
$ S " 5 s - s p t , i r - s d i e t e l y due and payab le and may p roceed t o e n f o r c e 
•:*•, r e n t cr.d s: :erc ise any end a l l o f the r i g h t s , and remedies 
p» -cv : i ad : *. Utsh code Ann. 7 0 ( A ) - 9 - 1 0 1 e t seq . as w e l l as a l l 
e t h s " r i g h t s end remedies p r c s s s s s e d t y secured p a r t y . 
GOVERNING LAW 
The v t l i d i d t y o f t h i s s e c u r i t y agreerrent and any p o r t i o n 
t h e r e o f s h s l l be d e t e r m i n e d ur.der and s h a l l be c o n s t u r e d 
a c c o r d i n g tenths laws o f t h e S t a t e Of U t a h . 
!r. K i t n e s i t h e r e o f t h e p a r t i e s have executed t h i s agreement 
the tiy i~*z •/€**• f i * * s t above w r i t t e n . 
Th<t FINANCINO STATEMENT it presented to t filing officer for f i l l / * pur*»M to tht Uniform 
Commercial Codt. 
1. Oebtor(s) (Lest N«iv First) and eddressles) 
Car) 0. Martin and, or Lor1 
Uynn Martinlnd. and, jointly 
2985 W. 1820 So. Vernal, Ut. 
soc**istcu'itY<* 443^58,2274 
E m p . F o d . l . O . N o . & 2 a - l U g a 2 0 
2. Secured rVty( i t f ) tnd eddress(ea) 
Robert D. and/or Monta Rae 
Showalter 
2700 W< 1500 No. 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
4. This financing statement covers tht following typo* (or iumt) of proptrty: 
ib Grots safes prict 
of collateral 
Tht Secured party if )(XX * * ° * • atHtr or 
purchase money lendtr of thecollaterei. 
$ 97,000,00 
$ 
or tret tax paid to 
Suttof 
For Fiing Offiotr (Ottt , Time. Number. 
and Filing Qffiot) 
t . Assignttts) of Secured Party tnd 
Addrtttftt) 
Microfilm No. Thif statement it filed without t N debtor's signature to perfect a security interest in cofttttrti. (Check QQ if so) 
B already subject to a security interest in another Jurisdiction when H wet brought Into this state. which is proceeds of the original collateral described above in which a security inttrtft wet perfected: 
Check QiJ) if covtred: Q Proceeds of Collateral art also covered. Q Products of Collateral art tfto covered. No, of additional Sheets presented: 
3. Maturity date (if any): Approved fry Oavtd $. Mortson, 
Lt. Governor / Secretary of State, for the Statt of Utah 
By 
-zr*& 
S*9n/tL!e(i)Nrf ^*Uitt(i)>f Oeotor(t) 
* V - $i«naturt(s) of Secured Party(ies) 
Filing Officer Copy - Alphobeficol S T A N D A R D F O R M - F O R M U C C - 1 . 
§ 67 DAMAGES 
for injury to property generally,11 damages are recoverable for 
mental distress caused by tortious injury to property, even though 
unaccompanied by personal injuries.1* 
The proper measure of compensatory damages for wrongful 
interference with a business is the diminution of the value of the 
business traceable to the wrongful act, as reflected by loss of 
profits, expenses incurred, or similar concrete evidence of injury.10 
§ 68. Personal property 
The proper measure of damages for the complete destruction of 
personal property is the reasonable market value of the property 
destroyed.*1 Neither the cost of the property* nor the expense of 
replacing it*3 is the proper measure. Where the property has not 
^een wholly destroyed, the proper measure of damages for its 
partial destruction is the difference between its market value 
immediately before and immediately after the injury;14 but if it can 
18. Sec §§ 68 ct scq., infra. 
19. § 73, infra. 
20. Diodes, Inc. v Franzen, 260 
CA2d 244, 67 Cal Rptr 19. 
For general discussion of damages 
for lost profits from injury to business, 
see § 81, infra. 
21. Sickles v Mt. Whitney Power A 
Electric Co,, 177 C 278, 170 P 599; 
Tatone v Chin Bing, 12 CA2d 543, 55 
P2d 933; Griffith v Bucknarn, 81 
CA2d454, 184 P2d 179. 
Damages for the destruction of a 
newspaper subscription book must, un-
less special damage is alleged, be lim-
ited to the value of the book. Nunan v 
San Francisco, 38 C 689. 
As to how market value is ascer-
tained, see § 49, supra. 
Annotations: Measure of damages 
for destruction of or damage to auto-
mobile other than commercial vehicle, 
32 ALR 711, s 78 ALR 917, 169 ALR 
1100; Measure of damages for loss of 
or injury to wearing apparel or house-
hold goods, 63 ALR 240; Measure of 
damages for destruction of or injury to 
commercial vehicle, 169 ALR 1074; 
Damages recoverable from warehouse-
man for negligence causing injury to, 
or destruction of, goods of a perishable 
nature. 32 ALR2d 910; Measure of 
damages for destruction of or injury to 
airplane, 73 ALR2d 719. 
Practice References: 3 Am Jur 
Proof of Facts 491, Damages, Proofs 
4-6 (proofs of damages for injury to or 
destruction of personal property). 
22. Nunan v San Francisco, 38 C 
689. 
23. Merrill v PaciSc Transfer Co., 
131 C 582, 63 P 915. 
24. Kincaid v Dunn, 26 CA 686, 
148 P 235; Rhodes v Firestone Tire A 
Rubber Co., 51 CA 569, 197 P 392; 
Menefee v Raisch Improv. Co., 78 CA 
785, 248 P 1031; Byrne v Western 
Pipe A Steel Co., 81 CA 270, 253 P 
126 23 Cal Jur 3d 
TATONE v. 
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TATONE v. CHIN B1NG et al. 
Civ. 1315. 
pistrict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
California. 
March 19, 1936. 
1. Damages <£=>I05 
Proper measure of damages for destruc-
tion of personalty is reasonable market val-
ue of property destroyed, 
2. Damages <§=»I74(I) 
In action for destruction of truckload of 
produce, evidence of price paid for produce 
at wholesale market on day of its destruc-
tion held admissible on question of damages. 
3. Damages @=>I39 
Evidence that truckload of produce had 
been purchased for $150 at wholesale market 
shortly before its destruction held to support 
judgment for $150 for its loss.' 
Appeal from Superior Court, Fresno 
County; Arthur Allyn, Judge. 
Action by Frank Tatone against Chin 
Bing and another. Judgment for plaintiff, 
and defendants appeal. 
Affirmed. 
Wakefield & Hansen, of Fresno, for ap-
pellants. 
Lucius Powers, Jr., and Barbour, Kellas 
& Backlund, all of Fresno, for respondent 
MARKS, Justice, 
This is an appeal from a judgment 
awarding plaintiff damages for injury to 
personal property. An automobile of de-
fendant Bing struck a truck of plaintiff 
loaded with fruit and vegetables which were 
destroyed in the accident. The trial court 
allowed pfaintiff damages in the sum of 
$150 for the loss of the fruit and vegeta-
bles. The correctness of the award of this 
item of damage is the sole question pre-
sented on this appeal. 
The agent of plaintiff had purchased the 
fruit and vegetables at a cost of $150, at a 
wholesale market in Fresno early on the 
morning of the accident. He was proceed-
ing to his markets in the west part of Fres-
no county when the accident occurred. 
Over the objection of defendants, plaintiff 
and his agents were permitted to testify as 
CHIN BING Cal. 933 
Mid) 
to the cost of the fruit and vegetables. 
Defendants maintain that their objections 
to this evidence should have been sustain-
ed and that there is no proper evidence in 
the record as to the plaintiff's damage 
caused by the destruction of the personal 
property in question here. 
[1] There can be no question but that 
the proper measure of damage in a case of 
this kind is the reasonable market value 
of the personal property destroyed. Murray 
v. Southern Pacific Company, 112 Cal.App. 
150, 296 P. 667. In an action for breach 
of contract to deliver personal property, it 
has been held that evidence of the price 
paid in the open market for like property 
to supply deficiencies in the delivery was 
not material to plaintiff's case in proving 
damage. Fairchild, etc., Co. v. Southern 
Refining Co., 158 Cal. 264, 110 P. 951. 
See, also, Mattern v. Alderson, 18 CaLApp. 
590, 123 P. 972. In Sanders v. Austin, 180 
Cal. 664, 182 P. 449, it was held that, while 
the evidence of the cost price of an auto-
mobile in use by the owner for several 
months may not be admissible, still if such 
evidence be admitted without objection it 
furnished some evidence of value. 
The case of Angell v. Hopkins,' 79 Cal. 
181, 21 P. 729, 730, was an action for the 
recovery of personal property, or its value, 
in case delivery could not be had. The 
court there said: "It is contended that 
there was error in admitting evidence as 
to what the property cost the plaintiff. It 
is quite true that the measure of damages 
is the value of the property at the time of 
the conversion, with certain additions in 
certain cases. Civil Code, § 3336. But in 
arriving at such value it was proper to 
take into consideration what the property 
cost as a circumstance to aid at arriving 
at its value at the time in question. Luse 
v. Jones, 39 NJ.Law [707] 708; Jones v. 
Morgan, 90 N.Y. [4] 10 [43 Am.Rep. 131]; 
Norton v. Willis, 73 Me. 580; Small v. 
Pool, 8 Ired. [30 N.C.] 47; Boggan v. 
Home, 97 N.C. 268, 2 S.E. 224; Rawson 
v. Prior, 57 Vt. [612] 615; Ford v. Smith, 
27 Wis. [261] 267; Roberts v. Dunn, 71 
111. [46] 50." See, also, Greenebaum v. 
Taylor, 102 Cal. 624, 36 P. 957. 
It has also been held that the price at 
which a thing can be sold at public sale, or 
in the open market, is some evidence of its 
market value. Yukon, etc., Co. v. Gratto, 
136 Cal. 538, 69 P. 252; Meyer v. McAl-
lister, 24 Cal.App. 16, 140 P. 42; Moore 
^=>For other cases see came topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexei 
934 Cal. 55 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 100 Cal.App. 
658, 280 P. 1008. 
In San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, 
118 Cal. 556, at page 568, 50 P. 633, 38 L.R. 
A. 460, 62 Am.St.Rep. 261, the rule is an-
nounced that the judicial test of market 
value depends upon the fact that the prop-
erty in question is marketable at a given 
price, which in turn depends upon the fact 
that sales of similar property have been, 
and are being, made at ascertainable prices. 
In Quint v. Dimond, 147 Cal. 707, 82 P. 
310, it was held competent to prove mar-
ket value in the nearest market 
[2,3] In the instant case the fruit and 
vegetables were purchased in the public 
wholesale market nearest the place of de-
struction a short time before the accident 
The price paid was the wholesale price of 
the articles asked in this market No con-
trary evidence was introduced by defend-
ants. Under these circumstances, the evi-
dence bore upon the reasonable market val-
ue of the fruit and vegetables, and sus-
tains the judgment 
Judgment affirmed. 
We concur: BARNARD, P. J . ; JEN-
KINGS, J. 
MacDOWELL v. CITY OF LONG BEACH. 
Civ. 9685. 
District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 1, California. 
March 24, 1936. 
Hearing Denied by Supreme Court 
May 21, 1936. 
1. Licenses <§=>39 
Statute providing that any person might 
furnish building plans for others after in-
forming them that he was not a certified 
architect held to authorize nonresident archi-
tect, who had informed his employer that he 
held no architect's certificate, to prepare 
plans and data for building to be erected in 
state (SL1901, p. 644, § 5). 
2. Licenses <§=>39 
Statute prohibiting practice of architec-
ture without a certificate but permitting any 
person to furnish building plans who gave 
notice of lack of certificate held not to pro-
hibit nonresident architect who gave such no-
tice from supervising construction of build-
ing, since statutory term "practice of archi-
tecture" is synonymous with "furnishing 
plans or other data for buildings" (St.1901, p. 
644, § 5). 
"Architect" is one who makes plans 
and specifications for a building, and su-
perintends its construction. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of 
"Architect" and "Practice of Architec-
ture," see Words & Phrases.] 
Appeal from Superior Court, Los An-
geles County; Robert W. Kenny, Judge. 
Action by J. Harold MacDowell against 
the City of Long Beach, wherein defendant 
filed a cross-complaint Judgment for 
plaintiff, and defendant appeals. 
Affirmed. 
Nowland M. Reid, City Atty., and Ed-
mund J. Callaway, Deputy City Atty., both 
of Long Beach, for appellant. 
Ivan L. Hiler, Herman Tepp, and Jay 
J. Stein, all of Hollywood, for respondent. 
SHINN, Justice pro tern. 
Appeal by defendant from a judgment in 
favor of plaintiff, in an action to recover 
fees for architectural services. 
Plaintiff, a nonresident architect, was 
employed by the city of Long Beach, under 
written contract, to prepare plans and speci-
fications for, and to supervise the construc-
tion of, a municipal auditorium. His com-
pensation was fixed at $84,000, of which 
$12,932,34 sued for herein, remains unpaid. 
The city, by answer and cross-complaint, 
alleged negligence in the preparation of the 
plans and specifications, and sought recov-
ery of $30,621.27, as damages. • Plaintiff's 
claim was allowed; the city was awarded 
an offset of $7,832.50 as damages, and 
plaintiff was given judgment for the differ-
ence in the sum of $5,108.77. 
Plaintiff held no certificate from the state 
board of architectural examiners. The 
court found that some two weeks prior to 
the date of the contract, plaintiff informed 
the city manager of defendant that he held 
no such certificate. 
The statute regulating the practice of ar-
chitecture, at the time of the contract 
C^For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes 
DEC 31 '91 14:52 COAST SEO-COHST-
P. 21 
S€C7ldN24 ATTORNEYS FEES 
In the event the parte* become Involved »n MigaUon or arbftf atfon with each other arising out of this Aprasmont or other 
performance thareof m *hich the services of an attorney or other expert are reasonably required the pre^ aflmgf party theJj b# 
fully compensated for the cost o* its pari opatfon In svch proceedings inducing fhe cost Incurred foe attomeye' fee* and 
•xperta* faas Unless judgment £o«* by default, the atlomeyt' fee award ahaK not be eon pi/lad in accordance wfifTarty oou4 
schedule but shaU be such as to fufy reimburse ail attorneys faas actually incurrad In pood faith, reoardtess of the »xe of a Juo^ment, ft being the intention o' fha pa lies to fufty compensate for ail attorneys* teas and experts' fee* paid or Incurred fit 
good faith, 
SECTION 25. LABOR AGREEMENTS (List labor aareements to which Contractor te signatory or enter NONE V Confrador ties no labor acreemenis) 
S t a t e o f C a l i f o r n i a C a r p e n t e r s , Cement Masons, Laborers . Operat ing Engineers and Tearrstere 
SECTION 25. SPECIAL PROVISIONS (Including unit pricing If applicable) 
Subcontractor w i l l f u r n i s h and i n s t a l l the f o l l o w i n g i t e a e ; 
Itea Description Quantity Uhit Price Agpimt 
1W Brill 29»+ Shaft and Set Beams 1 3 ^ 0 1^ # i ^ ^ AA?***"T 
#15 Mobilization for BriLUng Luep Sua f f 3^000.00 
^ > Total: •* I ^ L - S M B S B ^ 
Exhibit *A» ia attached to cad aade a part of th i s subcontract^-- — * -*- * - , 
CONTRACTORS ARE REOUIRED BV LAW TO BE LICENSED AnJO REGUUTSD BV TH£ CONTRACTORS STATE LICENSE BOARD ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING A CONTRACTOR MAY BE REFERRED TO THE REQISTOAROf* THE BOARD, WHOSE ADDRESS IS K% *£* 
Contractor* State License Board 
Post Office Box 26000 
Sacramento Catfcmla 9582$ 
Dated: \\ 3 * * 31 
OOaTTHACrofl: Coast Geo-Constructors, Inc. 
feted: December 2, 1991 
SUBCQWHACTOR: Rocky Mountain D r i i l i n g 
150 Executive Pari' Blvd., Su*tc 3600 
Sar *—anexsoo, Ci cin^l 
(Address) 
440566 A, B, C-57 4 C-61 
%fo^^Towner) 
2700 West 1500 North 
Vernal. Utah 84078 
(Address) 
(Contractor's License No.) 
( Contractor '5 License No.) 
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Ch. 9 CONTRACTORS § 7028 
7 0 2 8 ^ ) Contracting without license; second and subsequent 
offensesT It is a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the busi-
ness or act in the capacity of a contractor within this state without 
having a license therefor, unless such person is particularly ex-
empted from the provisions of this chapter. If such a person has 
been previously convicted of the offense described in this section, the 
court shall impose a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) 
nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or imprisonment in 
the county jail for not less than 10 days nor more than six months, 
or both. 
(Added by Stats.1939, c. 37, p. 384, § 1. Amended by Stats.1963, c. 1883, 
p. 3867, § 1; Stats.1969, c. 1583, p. 3218, § 4; Stats.1972, c. 125, p. 166, 
ID 
Historical Note 
As added in 1939, this section read: 
"It is unlawful for any person to en-
gage in the business or act in the capacity 
of a contractor within this State without 
having a license therefor, unless such 
person is particularly exempted from the 
provisions of this chapter." 
The 1963 amendment added two sen-
tences which provided: "Any violation of 
this section is a misdemeanor. If such a 
person has been previously convicted of 
the offense described in this section, the 
court shall impose a fine of not more 
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or 
imprisonment in the county jail for not 
more than six months, or both." 
Cross References 
Conspiracy by licensee as a misdemeanor, see | 125. 
"Contractor" defined, see § 7026. 
"Person" defined, see | 7025. 
Persons exempt, see § 7040 et seq. 
Punishment for misdemeanor where not otherwise prescribed, see Penal Code } 19. 
Violation of section as disqualification from taking contractor's examination, see i 
7065.1. 
The declaration making a violation of 
this section a misdemeanor formerly ap-
peared in section 7030. 
The 1969 amendment, in the first sen-
tence, substituted "It is a misdemeanor" 
for "It is unlawful", it deleted the former 
second sentence which had been added in 
1963, and it increased the fine to $2,000. 
The 1972 amendment provided for a 
minimum fine or minimum imprisonment. 
Derivation: Stats.1929, c. 791, p. 1591, 
f 1; Stats.1933. c 573, p. 1483, | 1; 
Stats.1935, c 816, p. 2215,11. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Insolvency as grounds for disciplining 
a licensed contractor (1964) 15 HastXJ. 
348. 
Licenses, effect of failure to comply 
with a licensing statute upon the right to 
recover for work done that should have 
been done only with a license. (1949) 23 
So.CaXL.R. 98. 
Minimum penalty for unlicensed con-
tractor. (1973) 4 Pacific L.J. 255. 
Penalties for violation of administrative 
rule. (1953) 41 C.L.R. 341, 344. 
Pre-emption of municipal licensing by 
state Contractors' License Act (1959) 47 
C.L.R. 607. 
Right of unlicensed subcontractor per-
forming services for general contractor to 
recover against contractor for services. 
(1958) 10 HastLJ. 89. 
Licenses <£=>40. 
Library References 
CJ.S. Licenses f § 66, 67, 78. 
203 
n~~> *-^> 
§ 7027.3 BUSINESS AKD PROFESSIONS a 
Some provision* in this section wers contained in 
former } 7026.11, added by Stata.1984, c 816, | 2. 
Library References 
Licenses •»U®. 
C JS. licenses f 30, 
} 7027.5, Landscape contractor; design authority 
A landscape contractor working within the classification for which the Beense is fesxied may de 
systems or facilities for work to be performed and supervised by that contractor. 
(Added by Stats4988, c 699, f 12.) 
9 7 0 ^ ^ Contracting without license; second and subsequent offenses; limitation of act! 
(a) It is a misdemeanor for any person to engage In the business or act in the capacity ( 
contractor within this state without having a license therefor, unless such person is Darticul 
exempted from the provisions of this chapter. 
(b) If such a person has been previously convicted of the offense described in this section, 
court shall impose a fine of * * * 30 percent of the price of the contract onder which the unhcen 
person performed contracting work, or four thousand five hundred dollars ($4.500), whicheyei 
greater, or imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 10 days nor more tnan six montfij 
(c) In the event the person perfonning the contracting work has agreed to furnish materials i 
lflbor on an hourly basis, "the price of the contract" for the purposes of this section means 
aggregate sum of the cost of materials and labor furnished and the cost of completing the work to 
performed. 
{d} Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, an indictment for any violation 
this section with respect to work done by the unlicensed contractor shall be found or an informat 
or complaint filed within three years from the date of completion of the work. 
(Amended by Stats.1982, c $07, p. 2589, } 1; Stats.1989, c 366, { 1.) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
1*82 Amendment Added subd (d). thousand five hundred dollars (R500), whichever 
1*8$ Leciilattos greater** for "not less than one hundred dollar* ($1 
The 1989 amendment, m subd <bX aabsb'tuted "20 " * " ? ! * **? ^ ° ****?*** ^ ^ W W ' . * 
percent of the price of the contract under which the « b d (c) defining the price of the contract"; and mi 
unlicensed person performed contracting work, or four nonsubstantive changes throughout 
Notes of Decisions 
Borden of prooi tLS by statute" and hordes of proof m contractor Sees 
cases it otherwise so prorided. FEEroore r. Irvine (Aj 
3 Dist.1983) 194 Calipfcr. S19, 146 CJUd 649. 
6. Additional pesaKkt 21 Sentence and punishment 
By enacting | 7031, the legislature manifested to Offense of engaging is business or acting in eapaci 
determination that the misdemeanor penalties otherwise
 0f contractor without being licensed is not a vktimle 
provided for contracting without a beenae constitute crime as a matter of law for purposes of orderb 
insufficient deterrent to prevent the conduct prohibited restitution and issue whether crime has a "victim" 
Brown v. Solano County Businesa Development, Inc. question of fact to be determined through evaluation 1 
(1979) 154 CaLRptr. 700, 92 OA^d 192. t ^ ^nit
 o f mdividuahied facts of case. People 
H*. Burden of proof Hays {Super. 1991) 286 Cal.Rptr. 462, 2S4 CalApp^d 2 
Notwithstanding EvidC. § 500 provision that one hi prosecution arising out of guilty plea to charge < 
claiming that another is guilty of wrongdoing has bur* engaging in business or acting in capacity of contract 
den of proof on the issue and that contracting without a without being licensed based on defendant's entry ini 
license is a misdemeanor (this section), defendant own- landscaping contract, trial court had to ascertain wbet 
ers, in action by unlicensed dry-wall finisher to tore- er contract was in any way induced by other party 
close mechanics' Ken, did not have burden of proving assumption that defendant held a contractor's licens 
that the finisher was an unlicensed contractor and, if so, then other party was a •Victim'* and restitotx 
under § 7031, barred from maintaining the action as hearing would have to be held People v. Hays (Si 
EvidC. § 520 is inapplicable when "otherwise provided per. 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 462, 234 Cal.App.3d 22. 
Additions or changes Indicated by undertlnsi deletion* by asterisks • # • 
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and calls for bid; and (c) all forms of advertising, as prescribed by 
the registrar of contractors, used by such a person. 
(Added by Stats.1972, c. 124, p. 165, § 1, operative July 1, 1973. Amend-
ed by Stats.1973, c. 153, p. 452, § 1, eff. July 6, 1973, operative July 1, 
1973.) 
Historical Nott 
The 1973 amendment inserted the let- Section 2 of Stats.1972, c. 124, p. 165, 
tered clause designations, substituted provided: 
"prescribed by the registrar of con- "Section 1 of this act shall become op-
tractors'* for "a contractor" and deleted erative on July 1, 1973." 
a sentence which had provided: "As used o^«4-t^ « o
 n* c?*«+„ <t<m ^ <r9 . ^r« 
in this section, 'advertising' has the mean-
 D r S £ 3 ° f S t a t s 1 9 ^ * 153> P- « * 
ing given it in Section 702*7." ^ ^
 8 h a U ^ ^ o p e r a t i v e ^ 
July 1,1973." 
Library References 
Licenses £»25. C J.S. licenses $ 35. 
§ 7031. Actions by contractor, alleging and proving license. No 
person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a con-
tractor, may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state 
for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act 
or contract for which a license is required by this chapter without 
alleging and proving that he was a duly licensed contractor at all 
times during the performance of such act or contract, except that 
such prohibition shall not apply to contractors who are each indi-
vidually licensed under this chapter but who fail to comply with 
Section 7029. 
(Added by Stats.1939, c. 37, p. 384, § 1. Amended by Stats.1957, c. 845, 
p. 2067, § 1; Stats.1961, c. 1325, p. 3105, § 1; Stats.1965, c. 681, p. 2059, 
§1.) 
Historical Note 
The 1957 amendment added a paragraph In 1961, the exception was added to the 
which read: first paragraph. 
"Until the expiration of six months «,.
 1 Q A - „^^A~A~4. i , * J ^ 
from the date of a suspension of a license ™ e 1965 amendment dented the part-
pursuant to Section 7068, the provisions g r a p h w h l c h h a d b e e n a d d e d Itt 1 9 5 7 -
of this section do not apply to any person Derivation: Stats.1929, c. 791, p. 1595, 
whose license was suspended pursuant to § 12; Stats.1931, c 578, p. 1262, | 12; 
Section 7068 for failure to notify the Stats.1933. c. 573, p. 1492, | 13. 
registrar within the 10-day period, if such 
failure was due to inadvertence." 
Form* 
See West's California Code Forms, Business and Professions. 
Cross References 
"Contractor" defined, see § 7026. 
"Person" defined, see $ 7025. 
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| 7030,5, Inclusion of license number in documents; advertisinf 
Code of Regulations References 
License number required in advertising, see 16 Osi 
Coda of Regs. 861. 
J 7030.6. Renumbered } 7099.11 and amended by Staia.1991, e. 1160 (A.B.2190), f 22 
} 7031. Actions by contractor; alleging: and prorinf license; enforcement of security intere* 
proof of licensure; substantial compliance 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (d), no person engaged in the business or acting in ti 
capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in any actioi 
in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act c 
contract for Which a license Is required by this chapter without alleging * • * that he or she was 
duly licensed contractor at all tames during the performance of that act or contract, regardless of tr 
merits of the cause of action brought by the person, except that this prohibition shall not apply 1 
contractors who are each individually licensed under this chapter but who faO to comply with Sectk 
7029. 
(b) A security interest taken to secure any payment for the performance of any act or contract f< 
which a license is required by this chapter is unenforceable if the person performing the act < 
contract was not a duly licensed contractor at aQ times during the performance of the act or contra 
(c) * * • If licensure or proper licensure is controverted, then proof of licensure pursuant to th 
section shall be made by production of a verified certificate of licensure from the Contractors' Sta 
License Board which establishes that the individual or entity bringing the action was duly licensed 
the proper classification of contractors at all tiroes during the performance of any act or contra 
covered by the action. 
(d) The judicial doctrine of substantia] compliance shall not apply to this section, except that 
court may determine that there has been substantia] compliance with licensure requirements, i 
purposes of this section, if it is shown at an evidentiary hearing that the person was a duly been* 
contractor during any portion of the 90 days immediately preceding the performance of the act 
contract for which compensation is sought, that the persons'* category of licensure would ha 
authorized the performance of that act or contract, and that noncompliance with the bcensu 
requirement was the result of (1) inadvertent clerical error, or (2) other error or delay not caused 
the negligence of the person. Subdivision (b) of Section 143 does not apply to contractors subject 
this subdivision. 
(e) The exceptions to the prohibition against the application of the judicial doctrine of substant 
compliance found in subdivision (d) shall have no retroactive effect These exceptions to ti 
prohibition shall only apply to an action or arbitration proceeding, at law or in equity, that 
commenced after the effective date of this section. 
(Amended by Stats. 1989, c 868, § 1; Stata.1991, c 632 (A.B.1S82), § 1; Stats. 1992, c 229 (AJB.241 
• U 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
lf8f Legislation prorisio&t foBowing "this section" n the first senta 
-
 €
„ ^ , * * . . _ * . *od added the second sentence; and added subd. The 1989 amendment rewrote the section. 
1992 Inflation 
1991 Legislation The 1992 amendment deleted "and proving^ foOo* 
*. ,,«*, j
 A. . j *» . . . . "without alleging" in subd (a); inserted "If licensun 
Hie 1991 amendment inserted the mtroductory e*cep- IksnsuVeis controverted, then" at the begini 
tjon m subd. (a); m subd. (d), added the exception
 0f guD<£ ^ 
Law Review Commentaries 
Contractor licensing in the construction industry: Life insurance agent fraud in California: Reba 
substantial compliance doctrine. 28 Santa Clara LRev. and related misconduct Douglas Haflett (1984) 17 ] 
(1988). oil LRer. (Calif.) 809. 
Contractors' state license law: From strict adherence Mechanics b'en actions—New statutory amendm 
to substantial compliance. Note, 9 Whittier LRev. 613 and future trends. Randall L Erickson, 14 LALai 
(1987). (Feb. 1992). 
Additions or chanyes Indicated by underline; deletion* by asterisk* * * * 
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Ft. 3 
CJ.S. Labor Relations § 1002 et scq. 
§ 1018. Unauthorized wearing of union button; misdemeanor; punish-
ment 
Any person who willfully wears the button of any labor union of this state, 
unless entitled to wear the button under the rules of such union, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not 
more than 20 days or by a fine of not more than forty dollars ($40), or by 
both fine and imprisonment. 
(Added by Stats.1953, c. 85, p. 807, § 1. Amended by Stats.1983, c. 1092, § 202, eff. 
Sept 27, 1983, operative Jan. 1, 1984.) 
Historical Note 
The 1983 amendment increased the maxi- Derivation: Stats.1909, a 331, p. 546, § 1. 
mum fine from $20 to $40; and made nonsub-
stantive changes. 
Cross References 




1020. Legislative intent. 
1021. Employment by unlicensed contractor, civil penalty for employer. 
1021.5. Contract by licensed contractor with contractor or other who is not valid 
independent contractor; civil penalty for licensed contractor. 
1022. Citation for violations; service; contents. 
1023. Content of citation or civil penalty; notice; hearing; final order, payment of 
penalty; judgment; interest on judgment 
1024. Industrial relations construction industry' enforcement fund; deposit of civil 
penalties; use of funds. 
Chapter 3.5 was added by Stats. 1979, c. 864, p. 3012, § 1. 
§ 1020. Legislative Intent 
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to establish a 
citation system for the imposition of prompt and effective civil sanctions 
against violators of the laws and regulations of this state relating to the 
employment of workers by unlicensed contractors and the utilization of 
unlicensed contractors and other persons who are not valid independent 
contractors by licensed contractors. 
(Added by Stats.1979, c. 864, p. 3012, § 1. Amended by Stats.1982, c. 761, p. 3008, 
§ 1.) 
Historical Note 
The 1982 amendment added language relat- invalid independent contractors by licensed 
ing to utilization of unlicensed contractors and contractors. 
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Div. 2 
§ 1021. Employment by unlicensed contractor; civil penalty for employ-
er 
Any person who does not hold a valid state contractor's license issued 
pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the 
Business and Professions Code, and who employs any worker to perform 
services for which such a license is required, shall be subject to a civil penalty 
in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each day of 
such employment. The civil penalties provided for by this section are in 
addition to any other penalty provided by law. 
(Added by Stats.1979, c 864, p. 3012, § 1.) 
Cross References 
Failure of employer to report all payroll of employees, request for payroll audit, see § 90.7. 
Library References 
Licenses ^^41. 
WESTLAW Topic No. 238. 
CJS. Licenses §§ 78 to 81. 
§ 1021.5. Contract by licensed contractor with contractor or other who 
Is not valid independent contractor; civil penalty for li-
censed contractor 
Any person who holds a valid state contractor's license issued pursuant to 
Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Business and 
Professions Code, and who willingly and knowingly enters into a contract 
with any person to perform services for which such a license is required as an 
independent contractor, and that person does not meet the burden of proof of 
independent contractor status pursuant to Section 2750.5 or hold a valid state 
contractor's license, shall be subject to a civil penalty in the amount of one 
hundred dollars ($100) per person so contracted with for each day of the 
contract. The civil penalties provided for by this section are in addition to 
any other penalty provided by law. 
(Added by Stats.1982, c 761, p. 3008, § 2.) 
Cross References 
Failure of employer to report all payroll of employees, request for payroll audit, see § 90.7. 
library References 
Licenses *=»41. 
WESTLAW Topic No. 238. 
CJS. Licenses §§ 78 to 8L 
§ 1022. Citation for violations; service; contents 
If upon inspection or investigation the Labor Commissioner determines 
that any person is employing workers in violation of Section 1021 or 1021.5, 
he or she may issue a citation to the person in violation. The citation may be 
served personally or by registered mail in accordance with subdivision (c) of 
Section 11505 of the Government Code. Each citation shall be in writing and 
256 
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Ft 1 
shall describe the nature of the violation, including reference to the statutory 
provision alleged to have been violated. 
(Added by Stats.1979, c. 864, p. 3012, § 1. Amended by Stats.1982, c. 761, p. 3009, 
§3.) 
Historical Note 
The 1982 amendment inserted "or 1021.5" in 
the first sentence and made gender related 
change. 
§ 1023. Content of citation or civil penalty; notice; hearing; final order; 
payment of penalty; judgment; Interest on judgment 
(a) If a person desires to contest a citation or the proposed assessment of a 
civil penalty therefor, he or she shall within 15 business days after service of 
the citation notify the office of the Labor Commissioner which appears on the 
citation of his or her request for an informal hearing. The Labor Commis-
sioner or his or her deputy or agent shall, within 30 days, hold a hearing at 
the conclusion of which the citation or proposed assessment of a civil penalty 
shall be affirmed, modified, or dismissed. The decision of the Labor Com-
missioner shall consist of a notice of findings, findings, and order which shall 
be served on all parties to the hearing within 15 days after the hearing by 
regular first-class mail at the last known address of the party on file with the 
Labor Commissioner. Service shall be completed pursuant to Section 1013 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. Any amount found due by the Labor Commis-
sioner as a result of a hearing shall become due and payable 45 days after 
notice of the findings and written findings and order have been mailed to the 
party assessed. A writ of mandate may be taken from that finding to the 
appropriate superior court, as long as the party agrees to pay any judgment 
and costs ultimately rendered by the court against the party for the assess-
ment. The writ shall be taken within 45 days of service of the notice of 
findings, findings, and order thereon. 
(b) A person to whom a citation has been issued, shall, in lieu of contesting 
a citation pursuant to this section, transmit to the office of the Labor 
Commissioner designated on the citation the amount specified for the viola-
tion within 15 business days after issuance of the citation. 
(c) When no petition objecting to a citation or the proposed assessment of a 
civil penalty is filed, a certified copy of the citation or proposed civil penalty 
may be filed by the Labor Commissioner in the office of the clerk of the 
superior court in any county in which the person assessed has property or in 
which the person assessed has or had a place of business. The clerk, 
immediately upon the filing, shall enter judgment for the state against the 
person assessed in the amount shown on the citation or proposed assessment 
of a civil penalty. 
(d) When findings and the order thereon are made affirming or modifying 
a citation or proposed assessment of a civil penalty after hearing, a certified 
copy of the findings and the order entered thereon may be entered by the 
Labor Commissioner in the office of the clerk of the superior court in any 
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county in which the person assessed has property or in which the person 
assessed has or had a place of business. The clerk, immediately upon the 
filing, shall enter judgment for the state against the person assessed in the 
amount shown on the certified order. 
(e) A judgment entered pursuant to this section shall bear the same rate of 
interest and shall have the same effect as other judgments and be given the 
same preference allowed by law on other judgments rendered for claims for 
taxes. The clerk shall make no charge for the service provided by this section 
to be performed by him or her. 
(Added by Stats. 1979, c. 864, p. 3012, § 1. Amended by Stats. 1988, c. 96, § 5.) 
Historical Note 
The 1988 amendment, in subd. (a), substitut- In addition, the 1988 amendment, in subd. 
ed "15 business days" for "10 business days'*; (a) inserted the third to sixth sentences relating 
substituted "30 days" for "20 dayr/*; and delet- to findings, orders, and writ of mandate; in 
ed the third and fourth sentences which read: subd. (b) substituted "15 business days" for "10 
"If the person receiving the citation does not business days"; and substituted subds. (c) to 
request a hearing with the Labor Commission- <e) f o r former subd. (c) which read: 
er within the prescribed time, the proposed 'The Labor Commissioner shall promptly 
civil penalty shall be deemed a final order of take all appropriate action to enforce the cita-
the Labor Commissioner and shall not be sub- tion and recover the civil penalty prescribed 
ject to further administrative review. The La- thereon or found to be due after a hearing. 
bor Commissioner's determination after the The Labor Commissioner may maintain an ac-
conclusion of the hearing shall be deemed the tion in any court of competent jurisdiction to 
final order of the director and shall not be recover the amount of civil penalties found to 
subject to further administrative review." be due," 
Cross References 
Employment of minors, contesting citation, procedure, see § 1289. 
§ 1024. Industrial relations construction Industry enforcement fund; de-
posit of civil penalties; use of funds 
All civil penalties collected pursuant to this chapter shall be deposited in the 
Industrial Relations Construction Industry Enforcement Fund, which is here-
by created. All moneys in the fund shall be used for the purpose of enforcing 
Section 226.2 ! and the provisions of this chapter, as appropriated by the 
Legislature. 
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to provide for the 
prompt and effective enforcement of labor laws relating to the construction 
industry. 
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An allowance of damages in a fixed sum for a loss of profits 
from the breach of a contract respecting the sale of a business 
does not constitute compensation for a loss of speculative profits, 
where the evidence reveals that the business, in the year following 
the defendant's breach, netted profits that actually exceeded the 
sum granted to the plaintiff for their loss." 
§ 81. Injury to business 
i| In allowing damages for loss of profits due to an injury to a business, either by breach of a contract or commission of a tort, the law makes a distinction^ nesses, in keeping;\mi^li^generawaii in 
order to be recoverable, must be reasonably certain and not 
speculative or remote.64 Thus, a loss of profits occasioned to an 
established business as the result of a breach of contract may, 
where the loss is neither a remote nor a conjectural consequence 
of the breach, constitute the basis for an award of compensatory 
damages." Similarly, damages for a loss of prospective profits due 
to a tortious interference with the operation of a business may be 
recovered if the business in question is an established one, and if 
the plaintiffs loss has proximately stemmed from the wrongful 317 P2d 182, cert den 356 US 937, 2 
L Ed 2d 814, 78 S a 781. De Flavio v 
Estell, 173 CA2d 226, 343 P2d 150. 
In a subcontractor's action against 
the prime contractor for breach of an 
electric transmission line construction 
subcontract, through cancellation of 
the work required by the contract to 
be done in a certain area, the fact that 
the subcontractor may have been los-
ing money in the area in which he was 
permitted to, and did, perform, did not 
establish failure of proof of damage, 
where the evidence indicated that 
plaintiff would have recouped his 
losses by performance of the cancelled 
work in the withdrawn area. Boomer v 
Abbett, 154 CA2d 218, 315 P2d 924. 
53. London v Zachary, 92 CA2d 
654, 207 P2d 1067. 
In an action for breach of contract 
to sell a bar business, an award of 
$2,500 was not speculative or dispro-
portionate where there was evidence 
that the business defendant refused to 
sell produced net income of $3,247.55 
in one year and $2,712.56 for the first 
eight months of the following year. 
Ribiero v Dotson, 187 CA2d 819, 9 
CalRptr909. 
54. See § 80, supra. 
55. Brunvold v Johnson, 36 CA2d 
226, 97 P2d 489; Hoag v Jenan, 86 
CA2d556t 195P2d451. 
23 Cal Jur 3d 159 
§ 81 DAMAGES 
interference.1* When the operation of an established business is 
prevented or interrupted, either by a tort or a breach of contract, 
damages for loss of prospective profits that might otherwise have 
been earned from operation of the business are ordinarily recover-
able since their occurrence and extent may be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty from the working experience of the business, 
from the past volume of business, and other provable data 
relevant to the probable future sales of the business.17 
I A loss of prospective profits from an unestablished business, either from a breach of contract" or from the commission of a 
56. Stoddard v Treadwell, 26 C 294; 
Dwyer v Carroll, 86 C 298, 24 P 1015; 
Hawthorne v Siegcl, 88 C 159, 25 P 
1114; Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v 
Alaska Packers9 Assn., 138 C 632, 72 
P 161; Barnes v Berendes, 139 C 32, 
69 P 491, 72 P 406; Western Union 
Tel. Co. v Commercial Pac. Cable Co., 
177 C 577, 171 P 317; Steiner v Long 
Beach Local No. 128, 19 C2d 676, 123 
P2d 20; Natural Soda Products Co. v 
Los Angeles, 23 C2d 193, 143 P2d 12, 
cert den 321 US 793, 88 L Ed 1082, 
64 S a 790, reh den 322 US 768, 88 
L Ed 1594, 64 S a 942; Smith v 
Shasta Electric Co., 190 CA2d 728, 12 
Cat Rptr 167; Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp. v East Bay Union of Ma-
chinists, 227 CA2d 675, 39 Cal Rptr 
64; Lucky Auto Supply v Turner, 244 
CA2d 872, 53 Cal Rptr 628. 
Malicious interference with a busi-
ness is a tort for which general dam-
ages, including loss of profits and in-
jury to the business* value and reputa-
tion, may be recovered to the extent of 
the foreseeable consequences of the 
wrongdoer's conduct. Drouet v Moul-
ton, 245 CA2d 667, 54 Cal Rptr 278 
Law Review: 34 SCLR 310 (loss of 
profits as element of damages in action 
for unfair competition). 
57. Grupe v Glick, 26 C2d 680, 160 
P2d 832; Stott v Johnston, 36 C2d 
864, 229 P2d 348, 28 ALR2d 580; 
Mann v Jackson, 141 CAJd 6, 296 
P2d 120; Gainer v Storck, 169 CAJd 
681, 338 P2d 195; Fibreboard Paper 
Products Corp. v East Bay Union of 
Machinists, 227 CA2d 675, 39 Cal 
Rptr 64; Drouet v Moulton, 245 CA2d 
667, 54 Cal Rptr 278 
In proving loss of profits from an 
established business in a leased store, 
the trial court did not err in admitting 
evidence relating to income from other 
stores owned and operated by plaintiff, 
and shown to have been operated un-
der conditions and circumstances sub-
stantially similar to those under which 
the store in question was operated. 
Lucky Auto Supply v Turner, 244 
CA2d 872, 53 Cal Rptr 628. 
As to computation of lost profits, 
see §§ 82, 83, infra. 
Forms: Allegation of loss of profits 
from injury to business, 8 Am Jur PI 
A Pr Forms (Rev) Damages, Form 78; 
Instruction to jury on damages for loss 
of business profits, 8 Am Jur PI & Pr 
Forms (Rev), Damages, Form 159. 
Practice Reference: 3 Am Jur Proof 
of Facts 491, Damages, Proof 8 (proof 
of damages for loss of profits due to 
injury to business). 
58. California Press Mfg. Co. v Staf 
160 23 Cal Jur 3d 
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tort,80 is considered too uncertain to merit compensation.60 A new 
business, in contradistinction to an established concern, is re-
garded in law as simply an adventure/1 which presents a mere 
possibility of earning future profits,*1 and the courts will not, 
obviously, presume that the profits anticipated from its com-
mencement will actually be realized by the parties to the ven-
ture.68 If one engages in a new industry, there are no provable 
data of past business from which the fact can be legally deduced 
that anticipated profits would have been realized.64 In other 
ford Packing Co., 192 C 479, 221 P 
345, 32 ALR 114; Hoag v Jenan, 86 
CA2d 556, 195 P2d 451; Handley v 
Guasco, 165 CA2d 703, 332 P2d 354. 
59. Natural Soda Products Co. v 
Los Angeles, 23 C2d 193, 143 P2d 12, 
cert den 321 US 793, 88 L Ed 1082, 
64 S Ct 790, reh den 322 US 768, 88 
L Ed 1594, 64 S O 942; Read v 
Turner, 239 CA2d 504, 48 Cal Rptr 
919, 40 ALR3d 237. 
60. The rule that, where the opera-
tion of an unestablished business is 
prevented or interrupted, damages for 
prospective profits that might other-
wise have been made from its opera-
tion are not recoverable because their 
occurrence is uncertain, contingent, 
and speculative, is not an end in itself 
but is merely an aid to determination 
of whether the fact of damage, as 
distinguished from the amount of 
damage, has been established with rea-
sonable certainty. Edwards v Con-
tainer Kraft Carton A Paper Supply 
Co., 161 CA2d 752, 327 P2d 622. 
Perspective profits of a new business 
or venture are too remote, contingent, 
jind speculative to meet the legal stan-
dards of reasonable certainty. Mac-
Morris Sales Corp. v Kozak, 263 
CA2d 430, 69 Cal Rptr 719. 
The rule that damages cannot be 
measured for prospective profits from 
an unestablished business was not ap-
plicable where plaintiff was awarded 
damages on the basis of defendant's 
infringement of plaintiflTs common law 
copyright in his lectures and invasion 
of plaintiff's privacy by using plaintiff's 
name and where the award of damages 
was supported by the testimony of a 
witness who had a well-established 
business as a publisher of educational 
materials. Williams v Weisser, 273 
CA2d 726, 78 Cal Rptr 542, 38 
ALR3d 761. 
Annotation: Measure of damages for 
breach of contract preventing opera-
tion of nonindustrial business in con* 
temptation, but not established or in 
actual operation, 1 ALR 156, §99 
ALR 938. 
61. California Press Mfg. Co. v Staf-
ford Packing Co., 192 C 479, 221 P 
345, 32 ALR 114; Handley v Guasco, 
165 CA2d 703, 332 P2d 354. 
62. Gibson v Hercules Mfg. A Sales 
Co., 80CA 689, 252P 780. 
63. Lacy Mfg. Co. v Gold Crown 
Mining Co., 52 CA2d 568, 126 P2d 
644. 
64. Handley v Guasco, 165 CA2d 
703, 332 P2d 354. 
In a government supplier's action 
for breach of an alleged sales contract 
for materials needed in his perform-
ance of the government contract, 
23 Cal Jur 3d 161 
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v. 
Gary LOSSE, M.D., et al., Respondents. 
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Supreme Court of California, 
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Prior report CaLApp., 274 Cal.Rptr. 31. 
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v. 




Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 24, 1991. 
Unlicensed subcontractor brought ac-
tion against owners and general contractor 
after retainage on contract to install surf-
ing pool was withheld. The Superior 
Court, Riverside County, No. I 54327, Noah 
N. Jamin, J., dismissed complaint, and sub-
contractor appealed. The Court of Appeal, 
267 Cal.Rptr. 874, affirmed in part, and 
reversed in part and subcontractor sought 
review. The Supreme Court granted re-
view, superseding opinion of the Court of 
Appeal, and, in opinion by Eagleson, J., 
assigned, held that: (1) statute prohibiting 
unlicensed contractor to recover under con-
tract that requires contractor's license con-
tains no implied exception for foreign enti-
ties, isolated transactions, or other "excep-
tional" circumstances, and (2) statute pro-
hibiting unlicensed contractor from recov-
ering under contract that requires contrac-
tor's license bars unlicensed contractor's 
claim for fraud when primary deceit al-
leged is false promise to pay, and damages 
primarily consist of, or are measured by, 
price for value of work and materials fur-
nished. 
Judgment of Court of Appeal affirmed 
in part and reversed in part 
Arabian, J., filed opinion concurring in 
judgment. 
Broussard, J., filed opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part in which 
Panelli, J., joined. 
1. Licenses <3=*39.43 
Statute prohibiting unlicensed contrac-
tor from recovering under contract that 
requires contractor's license contains no 
implied exception for foreign entities, iso-
lated transactions, or other "exceptional" 
circumstances. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & 
Prof.Code § 7031. 
2. Licenses <s=*39.44 
Statute prohibiting unlicensed contrac-
tor from recovering under contract that 
requires contractor's license bars unli-
censed contractor's claim for fraud when 
primary deceit alleged is false promise to 
pay, and damages primarily consist of, or 
are measured by, price for value of work 
and materials furnished West's Ann.Cal. 
Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031. 
3. Appeal and Error e=»79(2) 
Order dismissing fewer than all defen-
dants from action is a "final judgment" as 
to them, and is thus appealable. West's 
Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 904.1(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Pleading S=*216(l) 
If lack of capacity does not appear on 
the face of complaint, it cannot be raised 
HYDROTECH SYSTEMS 
Cite as 803 P2d 
by demurrer, but is special plea in abate-
ment. 
5. Appeal and Error <S=>174 
Issue of whether foreign corporation 
lacked capacity to sue because its com-
plaint did not allege that it had obtained 
required "certificate of qualification" from 
Secretary of State was not presented on 
appeal, where complaint did not disclose on 
its face that corporation had conducted "in-
terstate business" as defined by statute or 
failed to obtain any required certificate, 
and opposing party did not raise lack of 
capacity issue by special plea in abatement. 
West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031; 
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 904.1(a); West's 
Ann.Cal.Corp.Code §§ 191(cX8), 2105, 
2203(c). 
6. Licenses <3=>39.43 
Statute barring unlicensed contractors 
from recovering under contract that re-
quires contractor's license applied to unli-
censed out-of-state subcontractor hired to 
construct surfing pool in California, despite* 
isolated nature of transaction and subcon-
tractor's unique skills, where subcontractor 
did not substantially comply with licensing 
statutes. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 7031. 
7. Licenses <s==39.43 
Purpose of licensing law is to protect 
public from incompetence and dishonesty in 
those who provide building and construc-
tion services; licensing requirements pro-
vide minimal assurance that all persons 
offering such services in California have 
requisite skill and character, understand 
applicable local laws and codes, and know 
rudiments of administering contracting 
business. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof. 
Code §§ 7026, 7031, 7040 et seq. 
8. Licenses «>39.43 
Statute barring unlicensed contractor 
from recovering under contract that re-
quires contractor's license precludes unli-
censed subcontractor from recovering com-
pensation for his or her work from either 
owner or general contractor. West's Ann. 
Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031. 
v. OASIS WATERPARK Cal. 371 
370 (Cal. 1991) 
9. Licenses <£=>39.44 
Statute prohibiting unlicensed contrac-
tor from recovering under contract that 
requires contractor's license barred unli-
censed out-of-state subcontractor from re-
covering against general contractor for 
work performed on contract to install surf-
ing pool on fraud theory. West's Ann.Cal. 
Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031. 
10. Licenses <S=>39.44 
Regardless of the equities, statute pro-
hibiting unlicensed contractor from recov-
ering under contract that requires contrac-
tor's license bars all actions, however they 
are characterized, which effectively seek 
compensation for illegal unlicensed con-
tract work; thus, unlicensed contractor 
cannot recover either for agreed contract 
price or for reasonable value of labor and 
materials. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 7031. 
11. Licenses <S=>39.43 
Statute prohibiting unlicensed contrac-
tor from recovering under contract that 
requires contractor's license operates even 
where person for wrhom work was per-
formed knew contractor was unlicensed. 
West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031. 
12. Licenses <s=>39.43 
Unlicensed contractor may not circum-
vent clear provisions and purposes of stat-
ute prohibiting unlicensed contractor from 
recovering under contract that requires 
contractor's license simply by alleging that 
when illegal contract was made, other par-
ty had no intention of performing; statute 
places risk of such bad faith squarely on 
unlicensed contractor's shoulders. West's 
Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031. 
13. Corporations <S=*46 
Object of fictitious name statute is sim-
ply to ensure that those who do business 
with persons operating under fictitious 
name will know true identities of individu-
als with whom they are dealing or to whom 
they are giving credit or becoming bound; 
statute's purpose is not served by extend-
ing its protection to one who committed 
tort against fictitiously named business. 
West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 17918. 
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Sanger & Stein, and Rick M. Stein, Palm 
Springs, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Schlecht, Shevlin & Shoenberger, John C. 
Shevlin, Palm Springs, Alvarado, Rus & 
McClellan and Joel S. Miliband, Orange, for 
defendants and respondents. 
EAGLESON, Justice.* 
Section 7031 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code ! states that one may not sue in 
a California court to recover "compensa-
tion" for "any act or contract" that re-
quires a California contractor's license, un-
less he "alleges and proves" he was duly 
licensed at all times during his perform-
ance. We granted review to decide two 
questions. The first is whether section 
7031 permits an unlicensed nonresident to 
sue upon an "isolated transaction" in Cali-
fornia where "exceptional circumstances" 
exist, even though there was no substantial 
compliance with California's licensing law. 
The second—an issue of potentially broad 
importance—is whether section 7031 bars 
an unlicensed contractor's fraud action 
against the person for whom the work was 
done. 
[1,2] We conclude, as did the Court of 
Appeal, that section 7031 contains no im-
plied exception for foreign entities, isolated 
transactions, or other "exceptional" circum-
stances. We also hold, contrary to the 
Court of Appeal, that the statute bars an 
unlicensed contractor's claim for fraud 
when the primary deceit alleged is a false 
promise to pay, and the damages primarily 
consist of, or are measured by, the price or 
value of the work and materials furnished. 
Any other result would circumvent the 
clear statutory policy of deterring unli-
censed contract work. We therefore af-
firm in part and reverse in part the decision 
of the Court of Appeal. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff Hydrotech Systems, Inc. (Hy-
drotech), a New York corporation, manu-
factures and installs patented equipment 
* Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of 
the Judicial Council. 
designed to simulate ocean waves. Hydro-
tech claims that its product, and its skills at 
installing and maintaining the equipment, 
are unique. Defendant Oasis Waterpark 
(Oasis), a California corporation, owns and 
operates a water-oriented amusement park 
in Palm Springs. Defendant Wessman 
Construction Company, Inc. (Wessman) 
was Oasis Waterpark's general contractor 
for construction of the park. 
In July 1985, Hydrotech contracted with 
Wessman to design and construct in the 
park a 29,000-square-foot "surfing pool" 
using Hydrotech wave equipment The to-
tal contract price was $850,000. Wessman 
was entitled to hold back specified portions 
of this amount pending satisfactory com-
pletion and operation of the pool. 
Hydrotech later sued Wessman, and Oa-
sis Waterpark and its principals (collective-
ly Oasis). Hydrotech's suit claimed that 
more than $110,000 in "retainage" amounts 
were still being withheld although the pool 
had long since been completed and was 
performing as specified. The second 
amended complaint, filed November 29, 
1988, asserted claims against all defen-
dants for fraud, breach of implied contract, 
and money due and owing, and against 
Wessman for breach of written contract 
The complaint also asserted that full pay-
ment had been made for Hydrotech's con-
struction services, and that the unpaid bal-
ance was only for equipment and materials. 
In its fraud count, Hydrotech alleged as 
follows: Because it was concerned about 
licensing problems, Hydrotech wished only 
to sell and deliver its equipment and to 
avoid involvement in design or construction 
of the pool. However, Oasis insisted that 
Hydrotech's unique expertise in design and 
construction was essential. To induce Hy-
drotech to contract for these services, and 
"in response to repeated queries by Hydro-
tech," defendants promised that Wessman 
would arrange for a California contractor 
to "work with" Hydrotech on any construc-
1. All further statutory references are to the 
Business and Professions Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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Hon activities which required a California 
license. Defendants also promised to pay 
to full for Hydrotech's wave equipment and 
f0r "associated equipment and services/' 
in reasonable reliance on these promises, 
which defendants never intended to honor, 
jjydrotech furnished equipment and servic-
es in full compliance with its contract. 
jja(j Hydrotech known defendants' prom-
ises were false when made, it would not 
have performed under the contract, and 
therefore suffered damage according to 
proof. 
Defendants demurred on grounds, inter 
alia, that the complaint failed to allege 
Hydrotech possessed a California contrac-
tor's license. Hydrotech conceded it had 
no California license. However, Hydrotech 
asserted that it sought only unpaid 
amounts for sale of equipment, for which a 
license was not required.2 In the alterna-
tive, Hydrotech claimed that application of 
section 7031 was unnecessary and unjust 
because Hydrotech possesses unique exper-
tise in its field and provided construction 
services only at its customer's insistence. 
Hydrotech also argued that section 7031 
does not bar tort actions for fraud. 
The trial court sustained Wessman's de-
murrer to the written-contract count but 
granted Hydrotech leave to amend. The 
demurrers to all other causes of action in 
Hydrotech's complaint were sustained 
2. Hydrotech has not renewed this contention on 
appeal. 
3. Because Wessman was not dismissed from the 
suit, it is not a party to the appeal. There is no 
doubt, of course, that an order dismissing fewer 
than all defendants from an action is a "final 
judgment" as to them, and is thus appealable. 
(Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a); Justus v. 
Atchison (1977) 19 CaUd 564, 568, 139 Cal.Rptr. 
97, 565 P.2d 122; Seidner v. 1551 Greenfield 
Owners Assn. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 895, 901-
902, 166 CaLRptr. 803; Tinsley v. Palo Alto Uni-
fied School Dist. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 871, 880, 
154 CaLRptr. 591.) 
4. Oasis demurred specially on the additional 
ground that the complaint failed to show Hy-
drotech's capacity to sue because it did not 
allege that Hydrotech, as a foreign corporation 
conducting "intrastate business," had obtained 
the required "certificate of qualideation" from 
the Secretary of State. (Corp.Code, §§ 2105, 
2203, subd. (c).) The Court of Appeal conclud-
v. OASIS WATERPARK Cal. 373 
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without leave to amend. The trial court 
entered an order dismissing all defendants 
save Wessman from the action. 
[3] Hydrotech appealed the dismissal 
order.3 It argued first that the protective 
purposes of the licensing law are not 
served by applying section 7031 to a non-
resident who subcontracted at its custom-
er's specific request to provide unique con-
struction skills in an "isolated" California 
transaction. Hydrotech also repeated its 
contention that section 7031 does not bar 
claims of fraudulent inducement to enter a 
construction contract. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the former 
argument but accepted the latter. It re-
versed that portion of the trial court's judg-
ment which dismissed Hydrotech's fraud 
count, but affirmed the dismissal of Hydro-
tech's complaint in all other respects. 
[4,5] Hydrotech sought review on the 
"isolated transaction" issue, and defen-
dants sought review on the fraud question. 
We granted both petitions. As we explain, 
defendants' contentions have merit, but 
Hydrotech's do not4 
DISCUSSION 
1. Section 70S1 applies despite the "ex-
ceptional circumstances" of this 
transaction, 
[6] Hydrotech renews its contention 
that the "exceptional circumstances" of its 
ed it did not have to reach the qualification 
issue because it had held that Hydrotech's con-
tract claims were barred in any event by section 
7031. This analysis overlooks the fact that the 
appellate court did exempt Hydrotech's fraud 
claim from section 7031. Nonetheless, the qual-
ification issue is not presented by this appeal. 
Unless the governing statute states otherwise, a 
complaint need not allege the plaintiffs capacity 
to sue. If lack of capacity does not appear on 
the face of the complaint, it cannot be raised by 
demurrer, but is a special plea in abatement 
(See, e.g., Traub Co. v. Coffee Break Service, Inc. 
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 368, 370, 57 Cal.Rptr. 846, 425 
P.2d 790; Haley & Co. v. McVay (1924) 70 Cal. 
App. 438, 440, 233 P. 409; 5 Witkin, Cal.Proce-
dure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, §§ 1055-1056, pp. 
470-471.) Hydrotech's complaint does not dis-
close on its face that Hydrotech has conducted 
"intrastate business" as defined by statute (see 
Corp.Code, § 191, subd. (c)(8)), or that it failed 
to obtain any required certificate. Thus, no 
further discussion of the qualification issue is 
warranted. 
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dealings with Oasis make application of 
section 7031 unnecessary and unjust. Hy-
drotech points to its allegations that it re-
luctantly provided construction services on 
a one-time basis only because Oasis solic-
ited its specialized wave-generation exper-
tise, which was available nowhere else. 
Hydrotech argues that the "isolated" provi-
sion of such specialized services by a mere 
subcontractor should be deemed exempt 
from section 7031. The law, however, is 
otherwise. 
Section 7031 states clearly that, with ex-
ceptions not relevant here, "[n]o person 
engaged in the business or acting in the 
capacity of a contractor, may bring or 
maintain any action" in a California 
court to recover "compensation for the per-
formance of any act or contract for which a 
[contractor's] license is required . . . with-
out alleging and proving" that he or she 
"was a duly licensed contractor at all times 
during the performance of [the] act or con-
t ract . . . . " (Italics added.) 
Section 7026 provides that, for purposes 
of the license requirements, "a contractor 
is any person, who undertakes to or offers 
to undertake to . . . , or does himself or by 
or through others, construct . . . any . . . 
structure, project, development or improve-
ment, or to do any part thereof, . . . wheth-
er or not the performance of [such] work 
. . . involves the addition to or fabrication 
into any [such] structure, project, develop-
ment or improvement . . . of any material 
or article of merchandise. The term con-
tractor includes subcontractor and special-
ty contractor." (Italics added.) The nu-
merous express exemptions from the li-
censing law (§ 7040 et seq.) do not include 
foreign contractors, isolated transactions, 
or "unique" building services and capabili-
ties. 
[7] The purpose of the licensing law is 
to protect the public from incompetence 
and dishonesty in those who provide build-
ing and construction services. {Lewis & 
Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 
141, 149-150, 308 P.2d 713.) The licensing 
requirements provide minimal assurance 
that all persons offering such services in 
California have the requisite skill and char-
acter, understand applicable local laws and 
codes, and know the rudiments of adminis-
tering a contracting business. (Ibid.; Con-
derback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1966) 
239 Cal.App.2d 664, 678-679, 48 CaLRptr. 
901.) 
Section 7031 advances this purpose by 
withholding judicial aid from those who 
seek compensation for unlicensed contract 
work. The obvious statutory intent is to 
discourage persons who have failed to c*om-4 
ply with the licensing law from offering or 
providing their unlicensed services for pay. 
Because of the strength and clarity of 
this policy, it is well settled that section 
7031 applies despite injustice to the unli-
censed contractor. "Section 7031 repre-
sents a legislative determination that the 
importance of deterring unlicensed persons 
from engaging in the contracting business 
outweighs any harshness between the par-
ties, and that . . . such deterrance can best 
be realized by denying violators the right 
to maintain any action for compensation in 
the courts of this state. [Citation.] . . . " 
{Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 
151, 308 P.2d 713, italics added; see also 
Brown v. Solano County Business Devel-
opment, Inc. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 192, 198, 
154 Cal.Rptr. 700; Rushing v. Powell 
(1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 605, 130 Cal.Rptr. 
110.) 
Hydrotech concedes that it had no Cali-
fornia license, yet seeks contract compensa-
tion for activities which required such a 
license. It simply urges that California 
courts have recognized "exceptional cir-
cumstances" in which literal application of 
section 7031 would not further the pur-
poses of the licensing law. 
However, the authorities Hydrotech cites 
all relate to the well-established doctrine of 
substantial compliance. Under this rule, 
a contractor was not barred from a just 
recovery if his licensure was defective only 
inform and the defendant had received the 
"full measure" of protection intended by 
the Legislature. (E.g., Asdourian v. Araj 
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282-289, 211 Cal.Rptr. 
703, 696 P.2d 95; Latipac, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 278, 49 Cal.Rptr. 
676, 411 P.2d 564; Gatti v. Highland Park 
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Builders, Inc. (1946) 27 Cal.2d 687, 166 
P.2d 265.) 
Such is not the case here. The protective 
purposes of the licensing law cannot be 
satisfied in full measure unless the "con-
tinuing competence and responsibility" of 
those engaged in the work for which com-
pensation is sought have been officially 
examined and favorably resolved. (See, 
e.g., Asdourian, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 
285-289, 211 CaLRptr. 703, 696 P.2d 95.) 
Hydrotech does not state that it ever 
sought or obtained any such favorable offi-
cial determination of its qualifications, or 
those of its agents involved in the pool 
construction. There is no basis for an in-
ference that the law's full protective pur-
poses were served despite the entire ab-
sence of necessary licensure. Hence, Hy-
drotech has not alleged its "substantial" 
compliance with the licensing law.5 
Hydrotech claims the law's interests in 
competence and public protection were not 
disserved in this case because its agree-
ment to design and construct the surfing 
pool for Oasis was an "isolated" California 
transaction. However, as the Court of Ap-
peal observed, "It is manifest that the con-
cern for the public inherent in section 7031 
is just as applicable to a project done by an 
out-of-state contractor with few jobs in Cal-
ifornia as to a project done by a California 
contractor who performs only one job in 
California before going out of business." 
That Hydrotech's activities in California 
were "isolated" is not clear from the plead-
ings, but even if they were, there is no 
implied exception for "isolated" transac-
tions by foreign contractors. (Cf. Power 
City Communications, Inc. v. Calaveras 
Telephone Co. (E.D.Cal.1968) 280 F.Supp. 
808 [§ 7031 bars federal diversity suit by 
Washington contractor for value of unli-
censed California work].) 
5. Significantly, after the contract here at issue 
was made and performed, the Legislature con-
cluded that the judicial doctrine of substantial 
compliance does not adequately serve the pro-
tective purposes of section 7031. In 1989, the 
Legislature amended section 7031 to provide 
that the substantial-compliance rule "shall not 
apply to this section." (§ 7031, subd. (d); Stats. 
1989, ch. 368, § 1, No. 4 Deering's Adv.Legis. 
Service, pp. 1262-1263.) 
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Hydrotech also begs the question by sug-
gesting that Oasis' need for its unique 
skills should exempt it from section 7031. 
As noted, the licensing law achieves its 
protective purpose by requiring that a con-
tractors competence and qualifications, 
however unique, be examined and certified 
by the expert agency charged with the 
law's enforcement 
Hydrotech's "reluctance" to engage in 
design and construction activities, and Oa-
sis' insistence that it do so, are also irrele-
vant. Perhaps Hydrotech's good faith al-
ters the balance of equities in its favor. As 
we have seen, however, the deterrent pur-
pose of section 7031 outweighs any harsh-
ness in a particular case.1 
[8] Finally, we dismiss Hydrotech's 
claim that the law's protective purpose was 
served because Hydrotech acted only as a 
subcontractor and did not hold itself out to 
the public. Subcontractors are governed 
as such by the licensing law. (§ 7026.) 
Both owners and general contractors are 
entitled to protection against illegal sub-
contract work by unlicensed persons. 
Hence, an unlicensed subcontractor may 
not recover compensation for his work 
from either the owner or the general con-
tractor. {Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d 
at pp. 152-154, 308 P.2d 713; see Pickens 
v. American Mortgage Exchange (1969) 
269 Cal.App.2d 299, 302, 74 Cal.Rptr. 788.) 
We therefore conclude, as did the Court 
of Appeal, that Hydrotech has alleged no 
"exceptional circumstances" which would 
exempt it from the operation of section 
7031. 
2. Section 7031 bars Hydrotech's fraud 
claim. 
[9] The Court of Appeal accepted Hy-
drotech's alternative claim that even if sec-
6. Again, the Legislature recently underscored its 
insistence on a strict application of section 7031 
despite the balance of equities. The 1989 
amendments make clear that an unlicensed con-
tractor may not recover either "in law or equi-
ty," and that suit is barred "regardless of the 
merits of the cause of action M (§ 7031, 
subd. (a), as designated and amended by Stats. 
1989, ch. 368, § 1, No. 4 Deering's Adv.Legis. 
Service, pp. 1262-1263.) 
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tion 7031 eliminates contractual and quasi-
contractual claims seeking "compensation" 
for unlicensed work, it does not bar Hydro-
tech's recovery of tort damages arising 
from defendants' fraud which induced Hy-
drotech to contract and perform. Defen-
dants assert that the Court of Appeal thus 
erred. We agree. 
[10,11] Regardless of the equities, sec-
tion 7031 bars all actions, however they are 
characterized, which effectively seek "com-
pensation" for illegal unlicensed contract 
work. (Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d 
at pp. 150-152, 308 P.2d 713.) Thus, an 
unlicensed contractor cannot recover either 
for the agreed contract price or for the 
reasonable value of labor and materials. 
(See Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 
Cal.App.3d 156, 159, 81 Cal.Rptr. 453; 
Grant v. Weatherholt (1954) 123 Cal. 
App.2d 34, 41-42, 266 P.2d 185.) The statu-
tory prohibition operates even where the 
person for whom the work was performed 
knew the contractor was unlicensed. 
(Pickens, supra, 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 302, 
74 Cal.Rptr. 788; Cash v. Blackett (1948) 
87 Cal.App.2d 233, 196 P.2d 585.) 
[12] It follows that an unlicensed con-
tractor may not circumvent the clear provi-
sions and purposes of section 7031 simply 
by alleging that when the illegal contract 
was made, the other party had no intention 
of performing. Section 7031 places the 
risk of such bad faith squarely on the unli-
censed contractor's shoulders. "Knowing 
that they will receive no help from the 
courts and must trust completely to each 
other's good faith, the parties are less like-
ly to enter an illegal arrangement in the 
first place. [Citations.]" (Lewis & Queen, 
supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 150, 308 P.2d 713, 
italics added.) 
Hydrotech alleges that it was induced to 
enter and perform an illegal contract by a 
false promise to pay; that it would not 
have performed had it known the promise 
was false when made; and that it therefore 
suffered damage "according to proof." 
The complaint states no facts suggesting 
that the "damage" to be proven and recov-
ered is anything other than that asserted 
elsewhere in the complaint—i.e., the unpaid 
contract balance or its quantum meruit 
equivalent. 
In sum, Hydrotech proposes that defen-
dants' unenforceable promise to pay for 
illegal work is actionable because defen-
dants made the promise in bad faith. Such 
transparent pleading cannot be used to 
avoid section 7031. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that disal-
lowance of fraud claims like Hydrotech's 
would contravene the protective policies of 
the licensing law by encouraging profes-
sional contractors such as Wessman to 
seek out unlicensed subcontractors, secure 
in the knowledge that the work obtained 
would not have to be compensated. Justice 
Broussard expresses similar concerns that 
such a result would encourage the cheating 
of unlicensed contractors. (Dis. opn. of 
Broussard, J,, post, at pp. 526, 528, 530 
of 277 Cal.Rptr., at pp. 379, 381, 383 of 
803 P.2d.) We are not persuaded, however. 
A general contractor may be disciplined for 
subcontracting with knowledge that the 
subcontractor is unlicensed. (§ 7118.) 
Moreover, the unusual circumstances of 
this case aside, it is unlikely that a rational 
general contractor would intentionally risk 
liability for claims that his unlicensed sub-
contractor had performed substandard 
work. 
In any event, the statutory disallowance 
of claims for payment by unlicensed sub-
contractors is intended to deter such per-
sons from offering their services, or ac-
cepting solicitations of their work. That 
policy applies regardless of whether the 
other party's promise to pay for the work 
was honest or deceitful. 
Hydrotech suggests that the allowance 
of fraud claims would not nullify the pro-
tective purposes of section 7031 because, in 
many cases, unlicensed contractors would 
not be able to prove that the promise to 
pay was false when made, or that reliance 
on the fraudulent promise was "justified." 
(See, e.g., Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. 
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 30, 216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 
702 P.2d 212.) The point, however, is that 
the deterrent and protective purposes of 
section 7031 preclude recovery even when 
the person who solicited the unlicensed 
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did act in bad faith. (See Lewis & 
supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 150, 308 P.2d 
In other words, the falsity of the 
to pay is irrelevant, and the unli-
contractor will not be heard to say 
•t he "reasonably" relied upon it.7 
fgydrotech relies heavily on three Court 
# Appeal decisions suggesting in particu-
, contexts that section 7031 does not bar 
^unlicensed contractor's claims for fraud. 
Ye are not persuaded that those cases 
Qtrol our ruling here. 
Grant v. Weatherholt, supra, 123 
;5iLApp.2d 34, 266 P.2d 185, owners of 
Ijaiideveloped land persuaded plaintiff, who 
%fii& not a licensed contractor, to invest in a 
development venture. Plaintiff advanced 
funds, performed improvement work, and 
furnished materials, based on promises 
that his compensation would be credited 
toward the purchase price of a homesite. 
T^he owners had represented that the land 
was free of encumbrances, though in fact it 
was subject to a $25,000 deed of trust 
When the deed of trust was foreclosed, 
plaintiff sued for breach of contract and 
also sought tort damages for defendants' 
false representation of the state of title. 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the con-
tractual count but upheld the fraud claim. 
The court declared that section 7031 bars 
only claims "based upon contract liability" 
and does not shield persons who contract 
with unlicensed contractors from responsi-
bility for their own torts. (123 CaI.App.2d 
at p. 43, 266 P.2d 185.) In the Grant 
court's view, plaintiffs fraud cause of ac-
tion sought recovery not "for any act per-
7. In Tenzer, supra, this court held that an unli-
censed finder of real estate could sue in fraud 
upon oral promises of a finder's fee, even 
though his contractual claim was barred by the 
statute of frauds. (See former Civ.Code, 
§ 1624, subd. 5, now § 1624, subd. (d).) Among 
other things, we reasoned that an unlicensed 
person, insofar as he seeks compensation for 
activities which require no license, should not be 
held rigidly to constructive knowledge that a 
finder's fee agreement must be in writing. (39 
Cal 3d at pp. 27-28, 216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 
212; compare Phillippe v. Shapell Industries 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1247, 1259-1264, 241 Cal.Rptr. 
22, 743 P.2d 1279 [licensed broker barred from 
asserting equitable theory to enforce oral com-
mission agreement].) We also concluded in 
Tenzer that a statute designed to prevent fraud 
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formed by him, but for acts of the defen-
dants which resulted in his being deceived 
and damaged...." (Id., at p. 44, 266 P.2d 
185.) Among the "damages" recoverable, 
the court concluded, wrere the "money and 
services" plaintiff had advanced in reliance 
on the false representation. (Id., at pp. 
44-45, 266 P.2d 185.) 
In situations similar to Grant's, two oth-
er Courts of Appeal have also upheld fraud 
claims by unlicensed contractors. In 
Brunzell Constr. Co, v. Barton Develop-
ment Co. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 442, 49 
Cal.Rptr. 667, a contractor licensed only in 
Nevada agreed to construct an apartment 
building on defendants' California property 
in return for cash and notes. Defendants 
and the contractor planned a joint venture 
to own and operate the building. The con-
tractor was to invest in the venture by 
surrendering some of its notes for the con-
tract price. After the contractor incurred 
preliminary expenses, but before construc-
tion actually began, defendants sold the 
land. The contractor sued for anticipatory 
breach and for fraud, alleging that defen-
dants had concealed the sale negotiations. 
The court rejected the contractual claims as 
barred by section 7031. However, citing 
Grant, the Court of Appeal ruled that if 
plaintiff had been induced to enter an ar-
rangement defendants never intended to 
perform, a claim for fraud would lie. "In 
such case, plaintiffs [anticipatory] expendi-
tures would serve as a measure of compen-
satory damages . . . , although not recovera-
should not be applied to encourage it, and that 
the difficulties of proving fraud would prevent 
nullification of the requirement of a written 
agreement. (39 Cal.3d at pp. 2&-31, 216 Cal. 
Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212.) Tenzer is no basis for 
a determination that unlicensed contractors 
may sue for fraud. The protective purposes of 
the licensing law would be nullified if unli-
censed contractors were not held to knowledge 
of its requirements. Moreover, while the stat-
ute of frauds addresses only the formality of 
covered agreements, section 7031 seeks to deter 
any compensated work by an unlicensed con-
tractor. Indeed, Tenzer itself distinguished the 
situation where an unlicensed person seeks re-
covery for activities requiring a license. (39 
Cal 3d at p. 31, 216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212.) 
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ble as compensation under the con-
tract...." (P. 446, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667.) 
Pickens v. American Mortgage Ex-
change, supra, 269 Cal.App.2d 299, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 788, presented facts almost identical 
to those in Grant Plaintiff, an unlicensed 
contractor, alleged he changed his resi-
dence and did remodeling work on defen-
dants' property in reliance on promises that 
he would have an option to buy the proper-
ty and that his labor and expenses would 
be credited against the purchase price. Ac-
cording to plaintiff, defendants told him 
the property was encumbered by a $30,000 
trust deed but failed to mention an addi-
tional $25,000 encumbrance; they also 
promised to pay but never intended to do 
so. Relying on Grant, the Court of Appeal 
held that these omissions and misrepresen-
tations, if proved, would support a fraud 
claim not barred by section 7031. (Pp. 
303-304, 74 Cal.Rptr. 788.) 
[13] Dicta in these decisions suggest 
that tort damages are not prohibited "com-
pensation," and that section 7031 is inappli-
cable whenever the unlicensed contractor 
asserts he was induced to do illegal work 
by "fraudulent" promises or representa-
tions. Taken out of context, such a rule is 
8. In support of its premise that licensing stat-
utes do not bar tort claims by the unlicensed 
person, Grant cited In re Dennery (1891) 89 Cal. 
101, 26 P. 639, Ralph v. Lockwood (1882) 61 Cal. 
155, Thompson v. Byers (1931) 116 CaLApp. 214, 
2 P.2d 496, and Reeves v. First Nat. Bank (1912) 
20 CaLApp. 508, 129 P. 800. None of those 
cases construed section 7031, however. Rather, 
all were concerned with the statute barring suit 
by a business on its contracts or transactions 
under a fictitious name, until a fictitious-name 
certificate has been obtained. (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 17918 [formerly Civ.Code, § 2468].) 
The two statutory schemes are materially dis-
tinct. Failure to comply with the fictitious-
name statutes does not make the parties' prom-
ises, agreements, and transactions invalid as 
such Noncompliance merely prevents a ficti-
tiously named business from enforcing obli-
gations owed to it until it places on record its 
true nature and ownership. The object of Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 17918 is sim-
ply to ensure that those who do business with 
persons operating under a fictitious name will 
know the true identities of "the individuals with 
whom they are dealing or to whom they are 
giving credit or becoming bound." (Asdourian 
v. Arajt supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 289, fn. 8, 211 
Cal.Rptr. 703, 696 P.2d 95, quoting Levelon 
i  naive, overbroad, unsupported by the au-
thority cited,8 and impossible to reconcile 
with our reasoning in Lewis & Queen, $u-
I pro, 48 Cal.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713.* 
,1 Nonetheless, we stop short of disapprov-
i ing Grant, Brunzell, and Pickens insofar 
i- as they might apply to this case. The 
Legislature amended section 7031 several 
 times between 1954, the year Grant was 
decided, and 1986, the year Hydrotech ap-
\ parently finished its unlicensed work for 
•- Oasis. During that time, however, the 
l Legislature expressed no disagreement 
) with this line of decisions. The Legisla-j 
ture's inaction is some indication that it) 
) accepted existing judicial limitations on sec- • 
) tion 7031. (See, e.g., Wilkoff v. Superior 
1 Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 353, 211 Cal. 
• Rptr. 742, 696 P.2d 134; People v. Hallner 
1 (1954) 43 Cal.2d 715, 719, 277 P.2d 393.) 
We conclude, however, that Grant and 
its progeny are properly interpreted in the 
; context of their particular facts. In each 
case, the plaintiffs involvement as an unli-
censed contractor was incidental to the 
• overall agreement or transaction between 
the parties. By the same token, the pri-
mary fraud alleged in each case was exter-
nal to the arrangement for construction 
Builders, Inc. v. Lynn (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 657, 
662-663, 15 Cal.Rptr. 582.) The statute's pur-
pose is not served by extending its protection to 
one who committed a tort against a fictitiously 
named business. On the other hand, because of 
the dangers of incompetence and dishonesty, it 
is illegal to perform compensated work without 
a required license; the inducement or consider-
ation offered for the work is thus invalid and 
unenforceable ah initio. (See Lewis & Queen, 
supra, 48 Cal 2d at pp. 151-154, 308 P.2d 713.) 
That the inducement was falsely offered should 
make no difference. 
9. Justice Broussard asserts that we rely too 
heavily upon Lewis & Queen because that deci-
sion expressly recognizes situations in which 
denial of an unlicensed contractor's just claim 
would not serve the purposes of section 7031. 
(Dis. opn. of Broussard, J., post, at p. 529 of 277 
Cal.Rptr., at p. 382 of 803 P.2d.) However, 
Lewis <6 Queen makes clear that any claim 
against a person protected by the licensing law 
(i.e., a client of the unlicensed contractor) "falls 
squarel> within section 7031"; in such cases, 
"courts may not resort to equitable considera-
tions in defiance of [the statute] " (48 
Cal.2d at p. 152, 308 P.2d 713.) 
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work as such, and was thus unrelated to 
any protective concern of the licensing law. 
Under these extraordinary circumstances, 
the Courts of Appeal understandably con-
cluded that the peripheral involvement of 
unlicensed contract work did not shield de-
fendants from all tort liability. 
No California case has squarely held that 
an unlicensed contractor may transform a 
barred claim into a permissible one simply 
by alleging that the unenforceable prom-
ises of payment which induced him to per-
form were false when made. For reasons 
already stated, we decline to extend 
Grant *s reasoning to the situation present-
ed here. In a garden-variety dispute over 
money owed an unlicensed contractor, the 
contractor cannot evade section 7031 by 
alleging that the express or implied prom-
ise to pay for his work was fraudulent.10 
However artful the pleadings, if the pri-
mary fraud alleged is a false promise to 
pay for unlicensed construction work, and 
the primary relief sought is compensation 
for the work, section 7031 bars the action.11 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
reversed insofar as it upholds Hydrotech's 
cause of action for fraud, and affirmed in 
all other respects. 
LUCAS, C.J., and MOSK and 
KENNARD, JJ., concur. 
ARABIAN, Associate Justice, 
concurring. 
I concur in the judgment 
However, rather than attempt to distin-
guish the three Court of Appeal decisions 
on which Hydrotech relies (Grant v. 
Weatherholt (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 34, 266 
P.2d 185; Brunzell Const Co. v. Barton 
Development Co. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 
10. Though the point is not crucial to our hold-
ing, we note again the Legislature's recent con-
firmation that it intends section 7031 to operate 
regardless of the form of action attempted, and 
"regardless of the merits of the [unlicensed con-
tractor's] cause of action " (§ 7031, subd. 
(a); Stats,1989, ch. 368, § 1, No. 4 Deering's 
Adv.Legis.Service, pp. 1262-1263, italics added.) 
v. OASIS WATERPARK Cal. 379 
370 (Cal. 1991) 
442, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667; Pickens v. Ameri-
can Mortgage Exchange (1969) 269 Cal. 
App.2d 299, 74 Cal.Rptr. 788), I would over-
rule them as patently inconsistent with the 
statutory language and intent The mere 
fact that the legislature did not act to over-
rule these cases does not imply legislative 
approval. As we have pointed out on more 
than one occasion, "something more than 
mere silence should be required before that 
acquiescence is elevated into a species of 
implied legislation." (People v. Daniels 
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1127-1128, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225; accord Cianci v. 
Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 923, 
221 Cal.Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375; Moradi-
Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Compa-
nies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 300-301, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58.) 
RROUSSARD, Associate Justice, 
concurring and dissenting. 
I agree with the majority insofar as they 
hold that Business and Professions Code 
section 7031 (hereafter section 7031) bars 
plaintiffs actions for breach of contract, 
breach of implied contract, and money due 
and owing. 
However, I must dissent from the deter-
mination that the fraud cause of action is 
also barred. The language of section 7031 
has been repeatedly construed by the 
Courts of Appeal to permit actions for 
fraud, and the Legislature, despite amend-
ing the code section in other respects, has 
not changed the crucial language. Under 
the reenactment rule this should end the 
case. In any event, sound policy requires 
that the section should not be construed to 
bar any fraud claims. The majority's hold-
ing, barring some fraud claims but not 
others, not only rewards fraudulent wrong-
doers, but defeats the protective policies of 
11. Nor can Hydrotech claim tort damages stem-
ming from reasonable reliance on false prom-
ises that Oasis and Wessman would arrange for 
a licensed California contractor to "work with" 
Hydrotech on the pool project. Even if such an 
arrangement might then have "substantially 
complied" with the licensing requirements, Hy-
drotech chose to perform unlicensed contract-
ing activities despite the obvious absence of the 
promised California licensee. 
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the code section by encouraging intentional 
wrongdoers to seek out and hire unlicensed 
contractors, secure in the knowledge that 
the work need not be compensated. 
The complaint clearly alleges a fraudu-
lent scheme whereby defendants with the 
intent of avoiding payment under their con-
tract insisted that Hydrotech, known to be 
unlicensed, engage in contracting work for 
which a license was required. This is not a 
case where Hydrotech solicited work in 
California. Hydrotech did not hold itself 
out as licensed to contract for the design 
and construction of the pool. Indeed, Hy-
drotech refused to engage in contracting 
work. Hydrotech sought only to sell wave-
making equipment and sought to avoid in-
volvement in design or construction. De-
fendants insisted that Hydrotech's unique 
expertise in design and construction was 
essential and refused to contract without 
Hydrotech's services. All parties were 
aware that Hydrotech had a licensing prob-
lem. To induce Hydrotech to perform, de-
fendants promised, in addition to paying 
for the equipment, that arrangements 
would be made for a California contractor 
to "work with" Hydrotech on any construc-
tion activities which required a California 
license. Defendants never intended to, and 
did not, perform their promises. In re-
liance on defendants' false promises, Hy-
drotech furnished the equipment and ser-
vices in full compliance with the contract 
Now defendants, who solicited the contract-
ing services aware that Hydrotech could 
not lawfully engage in them, seek unjust 
enrichment because Hydrotech succumbed 
to their fraudulent promises. 
Section 7031 provided at the times rele-
vant here: "No person engaged in the busi-
ness or acting in the capacity of a contrac-
tor, may bring or maintain any action in 
any court of this state for the collection of 
compensation for the performance of any 
act or contract for which a license is 
required by this chapter without alleging 
and proving that he was a duly licensed 
contractor at all times during the perform-
ance of such act or contract, except that 
such prohibition shall not apply to contrac-
tors who are each individually licensed un-
der this chapter but fail to comply with 
Section 7029." (Italics added.) 
Until today, it was settled that section 
7031 did not preclude actions for fraud. 
(Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange 
(1969) 269 Cal.App 2d 299, 302-304, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 788; Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Barton 
Development Co. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 
442, 446, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667; Grant i>. 
Weatherholt (1954) 123 Cal.App 2d 34, 42-
44, 266 P.2d 185.) In the leading case of 
Grant v. Weatherholt, supra, the court 
reasoned: "Plaintiffs cause of action for 
fraud is not 'for the collection of compensa-
tion for the performance of any act or 
contract for which a license is required/ 
Plaintiffs right is the outgrowth of the 
deceit practiced upon him by the defen-
dants. The validity or invalidity of his 
contract does not affect that right. Proof 
of the contract under the cause of action 
for fraud was merely proof of the circum-
stances under which plaintiffs services 
were rendered and his money was expend-
ed. 
"Plaintiffs action for fraud is not barred 
by the provision of the above sections of 
the Business and Professions Code. The 
sections should be construed and applied so 
as to accomplish their purpose of protect-
ing the public from dealings with incompe-
tent or untrustworthy contractors. The 
courts will not impose penalties for non-
compliance in addition to those that are 
provided expressly or by necessary implica-
tion. The rule expressio unius exclusio 
alterius has application. [Citations.] The 
sections of the code which shield from lia-
bility those who enter into contracts with 
unlicensed persons do not purport to shield 
them from responsibility for their own 
torts, nor do they relate to actions or pro-
ceedings except those that are based upon 
contract liability Inasmuch as plain-
tiffs action for fraud is not for the recov-
ery of compensation under the contract or 
for breach of it, the fact that he was not 
licensed at all times does not bar his recov-
ery. He does not sue for any act per-
formed by him, but for acts of the defen-
dants which resulted in his being deceived 
and damaged/' (123 Cal.App.2d at pp. 43-
44, 266 P.2d 185; see Pickens v. American 
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Mortgage Exchange, supra, 269 Cal. 
App.2d 299, 303-304, 74 Cal.Rptr. 788.) 
The reasoning is unanswerable. The ma-
jority characterize the reasoning of Pick-
ens, Brunzell Constr. Co. and Grant as 
"dicta" (maj. opn., ante, at p. 525 of 277 
Ol.Rptr., at p. 378 of 803 P.2d), but this is 
the basic reasoning of the cases. 
The reenactment rule requires us to fol-
low these cases. " 'Where a statute has 
been construed by judicial decision, and 
that construction is not altered by subse-
quent legislation, it must be presumed that 
the Legislature is aware of the judicial 
construction and approves of it/ (People 
v. Hallner (1954) 43 Cal.2d 715, 719 [277 
P.2d 393]; People v. Fox (1977) 73 Cal. 
App.3d 178, 181 [140 Cal.Rptr. 615].)" 
(Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 
Cal.3d 345, 353, 211 Cal.Rptr. 742, 696 P.2d 
134.) Section 7031 has been repeatedly 
amended since the 1954 decision in Grant 
v. Weatherholt (Stats.1957, ch. 845, § 1, p. 
2067; Stats.1961, ch. 1325, § 1, p. 3105; 
Stats.1965, ch. 681, § 1, p. 2059; Stats. 
1989, ch. 368, § 1, No. 4 Deering's Adv. 
Legis. Service, p. 1262), and it has never 
provided that fraudulent wrongdoers may 
take advantage of the section or that denial 
of access to the courts in cases of fraud is 
one of the penalties imposed for violation 
of the licensing law. 
The majority pay lip service to this rule. 
In recognition, they say we should not dis-
approve Grant, Brunzell, and Pickens. 
But then they state each should be limited 
to its facts. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 525 of 
277 Cal.Rptr., at p. 378 of 803 P.2d.) The 
reenactment rule has always been that the 
judicial "construction" of a statute has 
been approved, not merely its application to 
specific facts.1 
Even if the reenactment rule were not 
controlling, the reasoning of the cases is 
compelling. 
1. The concurring opinion implies that recent 
cases have repudiated the reenactment rule. 
However, in the cases cited, either there was no 
reenactment (People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 
1119, 1127-1128, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225) 
or the provisions changed in the reenactment 
v. OASIS WATERPARK Cal. 381 
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Moreover, sound policy requires that we 
do not go beyond the legislative determina-
tion that contract and implied contracts are 
barred by section 7031. The purpose of the 
section is the enforcement of the contrac-
tor's licensing law. The purpose is accom-
plished under the code by denying the unli-
censed contractor the fruits of his labor 
and unjustly enriching the other party. 
The Legislature has thus established se-
vere sanctions and forfeitures. (Asdouri-
an v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 211 
Cal.Rptr. 703, 696 P.2d 95.) To further the 
purpose of deterring unlicensed contrac-
tors, the Legislature has provided that the 
unlicensed contractor may not recover in a 
contract action or implied contract action. 
It has never provided that fraudulent 
wrongdoers may be rewarded under the 
statute or that unlicensed people may not 
recover for fraud. 
This court should not go beyond the pen-
alties and forfeitures established by the 
Legislature and establish additional ones 
on its own. The Legislature has not abol-
ished tort remedies such as fraud, and we 
should not enrich those who rely upon sec-
tion 7031 in the perpetration of a fraud or 
in the consummation of a fraudulent 
scheme. (See Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. 
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 29-30, 216 Cal.Rptr. 
130, 702 P.2d 212; Seymour v. Oelrichs 
(1909) 156 Cal. 782, 794, 106 P. SS; South-
ern Cal. etc. Assemblies of God v. Shep-
herd of Hills etc. Church (1978) 77 Cal. 
App.3d 951, 958, fn. 3, 144 Cal.Rptr. 46.) 
As the Court of Appeal pointed out in the 
instant case, the purpose of section 7031 is 
frustrated by holding that fraudulent 
wrongdoers may escape their debts by as-
serting the bar of section 7031. As stated 
above, the purpose of section 7031 is to 
deter unlicensed persons from engaging in 
contracting. Allowing fraudulent wrong-
doers to obtain the substantial penalties 
and forfeitures and be unjustly enriched 
can only encourage owners and contractors 
were entirely unrelated to the provision previ-
ously construed (MoradiShalal v. Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 CalJd 287, 300-
301, 250 Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58; Cianci v. 
Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 922-923, 
221 Cal.Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375). 
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to engage in fraudulent schemes to hire 
unlicensed persons in anticipation that, 
when the debts come due, they can turn 
their backs and refuse to pay in reliance on 
section 7031. As in the instant case, Cali-
fornia contractors and owners will be en-
couraged to seek out and employ unli-
censed out-of-state contractors in the hope 
of obtaining services without paying for 
them. We should not encourage such 
wrongdoing. On the other hand, the legis-
lative policy of deterrence is not furthered 
by denying recovery for fraud. Unlicensed 
contractors are not encouraged to under-
take the unlawful activity by the remote 
possibility that, if unpaid, they might be 
able to prove fraud. 
In view of the language of section 7031, 
its consistent construction by the Courts of 
Appeal, and its history, it is apparent that 
the Legislature has balanced the dangers 
of encouraging fraud against the violation 
of the licensing statute and concluded 
against rewarding the fraudulent We 
should accept its judgment 
The majority rely at length on Lewis & 
Queen v. NM Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 
141, 308 P.2d 713 (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 
523, 524, 525 of 277 Cal.Rptr., at pp. 376, 
377, 378 of 803 P.2d), but fail to point out 
that the court expressly stated that it was 
enforcing the terms of the statute and need 
not consider whether the harshness of the 
forfeiture, the evil of unjust enrichment, 
and avoidance of encouraging illegal con-
duct counselled in favor of enforcing the 
illegal contract (48 Cal.2d at pp. 151-152, 
308 P.2d 713.) In the course of its discus-
sion, the court expressly recognized that in 
some cases "effective deterrence is best 
realized by enforcing the plaintiffs claim 
rather than leaving the defendant in pos-
session of the benefit" (48 Cal.2d at p. 
151, 308 P.2d 713.) In short, Lewis & 
Queen avoided the question whether courts 
in the absence of a statutory provision im-
posing a forfeiture penalty would refuse to 
enforce the illegal contracts violating the 
licensing law. 
The case is of little help to the fhajority. 
The majority go beyond the words of the 
statute, as we have seen. Thus, the major-
ity must show that "effective deterrence is 
best realized" by leaving the defendant in 
possession of the benefit They fail to do 
so. 
The majority appear to take the position 
that the provisions of section 7031 will be 
rendered meaningless if an unlicensed con-
tractor can avoid them by alleging fraud. 
The argument is not a new one. Prior to 
this court's decision in Tenzer v. Super-
scope, Inc., supra, 39 Cal.3d 18, 216 Cal. 
Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212, a few Court of 
Appeal decisions had reasoned that if a 
plaintiff, by the transparent device of 
pleading an intention not to perform at the 
time of entering into a contract, could avoid 
statutory provisions designed to prevent 
fraud like the statute of frauds, the statute 
would be ineffective. However, mere 
pleading of fraud is not sufficient; the 
plaintiff must also prove fraud. In Tenzer 
the court pointed out that the argument in 
the Court of Appeal decisions assumes the 
inability of a jury to distinguish between an 
unkept but honest promise to perform and 
one which the promisor never intended to 
perform. As Justice Kaus observed in 
Southern Cal etc. Assemblies of God v. 
Shepherd of Hills etc. Church, supra, 77 
Cal.App.3d 951, 958, footnote 3, 144 Cal. 
Rptr. 46: "The law is otherwise. {People 
v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 263-264 [267 
P.2d 271].)" (39 CaL3d at p. 29, 216 Cal. 
Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212.) In Tenzer, the 
court concluded that the argument that 
actual fraud must be permitted to effectu-
ate a statute designed to prevent fraud was 
invalid and disapproved the contrary cases. 
(39 Cal.3d at pp. 29-31, 216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 
702 P.2d 212.) In urging that the courts 
must grant rewards to those who engage 
in fraudulent conduct, the majority are 
seeking to resurrect the cases disapproved 
in Tenzer. 
In fairness to the majority, I must recog-
nize that they do not propose to prohibit all 
actions for fraud brought by an unlicensed 
contractor. The majority conclude that the 
proper result was reached in each of the 
cases, Grant, Brunzell, and Pickens, 
where the Courts of Appeal held that the 
cause of action for fraud by an unlicensed 
contractor was not barred by section 7031. 
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(Maj- °Pn» <*nte> at p. 525 of 277 Cal.Rptr., 
at p. 378 of 803 P.2d.) The majority state 
that the distinction between those fraud 
cases and the instant one is that "the pri-
mary fraud alleged in each case was exter-
Dal to the construction work as such/' 
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 525 of 277 Cal.Rptr., 
at p. 378 of 803 P.2d.) I am not sure what 
the distinction is. In each case the claim 
was that the owner or contractor did not 
intend to perform. In each case the plain-
tiff was seeking to recover damages so far 
as appears measured by the falsely prom-
ised performance. 
If the distinction sought to be made is 
between fraud cases where the interest 
protected is collateral to the licensing law 
and those where the code section is intend-
ed as the instrument of fraud, the majori-
ty^ priorities are misplaced, and even were 
we to apply them, the majority reach the 
wrong result on the facts of the case. As 
between fraudulent wrongdoers who seek 
to take advantage of their victims on the 
basis of section 7031 and those who indulge 
in other fraudulent conduct, the law should 
be most concerned with those whose fraud-
ulent schemes seek to take advantage of 
the statute. Secondly, under the allega-
v. OASIS WATERPARK Cal. 383 
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tions of the complaint, plaintiff sought to 
sell its wave-making product to defendant 
without contracting to do the installation. 
The sale obviously would not involve a vio-
lation of the contractor's licensing statute. 
It was the defendants who insisted that 
plaintiff engage in the installation of the 
product and undertake work requiring a 
license. When the lack of a contractor's 
license was raised, it wTas the defendants 
who promised to arrange for a licensed 
contractor, never intending to perform 
their promises. The basic agreement was 
for the sale of the equipment, and under 
the test apparently established by the ma-
jority, the construction and supervision ser-
vices appear to be collateral. 
I cannot agree that wre should reward 
fraudulent parties and I would affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
PANELLI, J., concurs. 
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LEWIS & QUEEN, a Partnership, 
George W. Lewis and Paul C. Queen, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
tf. M. BALL SONS, a Partnership, et aL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
S. F. 19563. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
March 19, 1957. 
Behearing Denied April 17, 1957. 
Action for breach of rental agreements 
to furnish equipment for performance of 
work under defendant's parkway construc-
tion contracts with state, wherein defend-
ant filed a counterclaim. The Superior 
Court, Alameda County, Chris B. Fox, J., 
entered judgment for defendants, and from 
such judgment and order denying a new 
trial, plaintiff appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Traynor, J., held that the plaintiff, 
as subcontractor, had acted as a contractor 
without being licensed as such, as required 
by West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, § 7028, 
and hence, under § 7031, could not main-
tain action against principal contractor or 
sureties on its bonds for breach of rental 
agreements. 
Appeal from order denying motion for 
new trial dismissed and judgment affirmed. 
Opinion, 297 P.2d 120, vacated 
Carter and Schauer, JJ., dissented. 
I. Highways <£=>II0 
In action for breach of equipment 
rental agreements by holder of parkway 
construction contracts with state, findings 
that plaintiff and defendant had entered 
}ntt> T«rta\ agreements ioi the pmpose oi 
circumventing requirement under state con-
tracts that defendant must perform at least 
50% of work embraced in state contracts 
and that real agreement between the par-
ties was for plaintiff to perform more than 
50% of ^ork under state contracts as an 
integrated subcontract operation in viola-
tion of state contracts were supported by 
substantial evidence. 
308 P.2d—45% 
N. M. BALL SONS Cal. 7 1 3 
P 2d 713 
2. Appeal and Error O I 10, 870(6) 
Order denying a new trial is not ap-
pealable but may be reviewed on appeal 
from judgment. West's Ann.Code Civ. 
Proa, § 956. 
3. Licenses <S=?39.44 
In action against holder of parkway 
construction contracts with state and sure-
ties on contractors bonds for breach of 
equipment rental agreements, evidence es-
tablished that, notwithstanding form of 
rental agreements, plaintiff actually under-
took to and did in fact construct a high-
way for contractor and thereby acted as 
a contractor within meaning of statute 
making it unlawful to engage in the busi-
ness or act in the capacity of a contractor 
without a license. West's Ann.Code Civ 
Proa, § 1192.1; West's Ann.Gov.Code, § 
4200; West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 
7026, 7028, 7031. 
4. Contracts ®=^346(l) 
Where evidence shows that plaintiff 
in substance seeks to enforce an illegal 
contract or recover compensation for an 
illegal act, court, regardless of the plead-
ings, has the power and duty to ascertain 
the true facts in order that it may not lend 
its assistance to the consummation or en-
couragement of what public policy forbids. 
5. Appeal and Error <§=>I73(6) 
Arbitration and Award <3=>85(l) 
Contracts <S=M38(6) 
New Trial <£=>26 
The issue of illegality of contract 
sought to be enforced or of act for which 
recovery of compensation is sought may 
be raised for the first time on motion for 
new trial, in proceeding to enforce arbitra-
tion award, or on appeal, and, even though 
parties, whether by inadvertence or con-
sent, do not raise the issue, court may do 
so on its own motion. 
6. Evidence <§=»437 
In action for breach of written agree-
ments for rental of road construction 
equipment, though such agreements stated 
that they contained all provisions agreed 
to by the parties, parol evidence was ad-
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missible to show true nature of agreement 
between the parties and that plaintiff had 
in fact acted as a contractor within statute 
making it unlawful to do so without a li-
cense. West's Ann Code Civ.Proc, § 1856; 
West's Ann Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 
7028, 7031. 
7. Evidence <§=s437 
Parol evidence rule does not exclude 
evidence showing that a written contract 
lawful on its face is in fact part of an 
illegal transaction. West's Ann.Code Civ. 
Proa , § 1856. 
& Contracts <S=*346(!) 
Evidence <£=>437 
The policy in favor of narrowing is-
sues in dispute to those made by the plead-
ings, and the policy of parol evidence rule 
favoring the conclusiveness of integrated 
written agreements give way before the 
importance of discouraging illegal conduct, 
and trial court, notwithstanding such poli-
cies, must be free to search out illegality 
lying behind the form in which the parties 
have cast transaction to conceal such ille-
gality. 
9. Licenses <^!l(5) 
Statutes regulating the contracting 
business and providing for the licensing 
of contractors were intended to protect the 
public against dishonesty and incompetency 
in the administration of contracting busi-
ness as well as in the actual performance 
of contract West's Ann.Bus. & Prof, 
Code, §§ 7025, 7026, 7028-7031, 7068, 7069, 
7120. 
10. Licenses <£=>20 
Where contractor is a partnership, the 
experience, knowledge, and integrity of 
each partner is a vital consideration in 
determining whether to issue contractor's 
license. West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, 
§§ 7025, 7026, 7028-7031, 7067, 7069, 7071. 
11. Licenses <§=>39.43 
That one of two members of partner-
ship which acted as a contractor held a 
contractor's license did not constitute sub-
stantial compliance with statutory licensing 
requirements and did not enable partner-
ship to maintain action for breach of con-
tract. West's Ann Bus. & Prof Code, §§ 
7025, 7026, 7028-7031, 7067-7069, 7071, 7120. 
12. Contracts <§=*I38(1) 
Generally, courts will not enforce an 
illegal bargain or lend their assistance to 
a person who seeks compensation for an 
illegal act regardless of consequent injus-
tice between the parties. 
13. Contracts <&=>I38<!) 
How the policy of deterring illegal 
contracts can best be achieved depends on 
the kind of illegality and the particular 
facts involved. 
14. Licenses <£=>39.43 
Where highway subcontractor acted 
as contractor without a license, fact that 
principal contractor had been paid in full 
for all work done under highway construc-
tion contract and should in justice be re-
quired to turn over to subcontractor pro-
ceeds from principal contract attributable 
to subcontractor's work did not enable sub-
contractor to maintain action against prin-
cipal contractor for breach of subcontract, 
in view of statutory provision prohibiting 
maintenance of action for compensation for 
performance of any act or contract for 
which a license is required without allega-
tion and proof that party bringing action 
was a licensed contractor during perform-
ance of act or contract. West's Ann.Bus. 
& Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031. 
15. Contracts <§=>139 
Where statute is enacted for the pur-
pose of protecting one class of persons 
from the activities of another, a member 
of protected class, though he has shared 
in illegal transaction, is said not to be 
in pari delicto and may maintain action 
against a member of the class primarily 
to be deterred. 
16. Licenses <^39.43 
The class protected by statute provid-
ing for the licensing of contractors in-
cludes those who deal with a person re-
quired by statute to have a license, and 
where the person required to have a license 
but having none is himself a subcontractor, 
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he is not to be protected from his own un-
licensed activities. West's Ann.Bus. & 
Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031. 
17. Licenses C=*39.43 
Subcontractor, having acted as con-
tractor without being licensed as such, as 
required by statute, could not maintain ac-
tion against principal contractor for breach 
of subcontract on theory that principal 
contractor was not a member of the class 
to be protected by licensing statute. West's 
Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031. 
18. Licenses <§=»39.43 
Subcontractor, having acted as con-
tractor without being licensed as such, as 
required by statute, could not maintain ac-
tion against principal contractor for breach 
of subcontract on theory that principal 
contractor was a licensed member of same 
profession as subcontractor and not the 
owner for whose ultimate benefit work was 
done. West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 
7026, 7028, 7031. 
19. Licenses <§=>39.44 
Action to enforce arbitration award or 
foreclose mechanic's lien is an action within 
meaning of statutory provision prohibiting 
maintenance of any action on a contract 
for which contractor's license is required 
without allegation and proof that party 
bringing action was a licensed contractor 
during performance of contract. West's 
Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031. 
20. Principal and Surety <&»I43 
Defense of illegality of contract is 
available to surety, if it is available to his 
principal. 
21. Licenses <§=»39.43 
The obligation of sureties on labor 
and material bonds and stop notice bonds 
posted by holder of parkway construction 
contract with state was to pay only if a 
legal and valid claim for compensation 
was established against principal contractor 
without reference to bonds, and hence, since 
subcontractor, having acted as contractor 
without being licensed as such, as required 
by statute, could not maintain action against 
principal contractor for breach of subcon-
tract, such action could not be maintained 
against sureties on principal contractor's 
bonds. West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc, § 1192.-
1; West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 2810; West's 
Ann.Gov.Code, § 4200; West's Ann.Bus. 
& Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031. 
Howard B. Crittenden, Jr., San Fran-
cisco, for appellants. 
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges,. 
Gordon Johnson and Dario De Benedictis,. 
San Francisco, for respondents. 
TRAYNOR, Justice. 
Plaintiffs George W. Lewis and Paul C 
Queen are engaged in the contracting busi-
ness as the partnership of Lewis and 
Queen, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff. 
Defendant Ball Sons, hereinafter referred 
to as defendant, is also in the contracting 
business. 
In June, 1949, defendant was awarded 
two contracts by the state, each contract 
for the construction of a separate section 
of the Hollywood Parkway. Defendant 
then entered into four contracts with plain-
tiff. With respect to the work to be done 
on each section of the parkway,, there were 
two contracts between plaintiff and defend-
ant. The first was entitled a "subcontract," 
and under it plaintiff agreed to remove con-
crete encountered during excavation of the 
roadway and apply water needed in the 
process of compacting the ground. The 
second was entitled an "equipment rental 
agreement," and under it plaintiff agreed 
to provide defendant with construction 
equipment for road excavation, "overhaul," 
and compacting. 
Plaintiff brought this action for damages 
for breach of the equipment rental agree-
ments and for the reasonable rental value 
of equipment alleged to have been held be-
yond the agreed rental term. Plaintiff also 
sought to recover against sureties on labor 
and material bonds posted by defendant in 
compliance with Government Code section 
4200 before commencing work on the park-
way, and stop notice bonds posted by de-
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fendant pursuant to Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 1184e (now section 1192.1) 
after the present dispute arose. Defend-
ant answered denying that it had breached 
the rental agreements, and filed a cross-
complaint in which it alleged a breach of 
the agreements by plaintiff and sought to 
recover overpayments made to plaintiff. 
The trial court found that before the 
execution of the rental agreements plain-
tiff and defendant had entered into an oral 
agreement that plaintiff would undertake 
as a single subcontract the removal of con-
crete, application of water, excavation, 
overhaul, and compacting of original 
ground. Defendant then discovered that 
if it subcontracted all of this work, it would 
violate provisions in its contracts with the 
state that required it to perform with its 
own organization work of a value of not 
less than fifty per cent of the value of all 
the work embraced in the state contracts. 
The parties agreed therefore, with the in-
tention of circumventing the provisions in 
the state contracts, to divide the five items 
of work under each state contract between 
two writings, a subcontract and an equip-
ment rental agreement. Notwithstanding 
the form of these writings, it remained the 
agreement of the parties that plaintiff 
would perform all five items of work as 
an integrated subcontract operation. 
[1] There was substantial evidence to 
support these findings. The rental agree-
ments themselves provided for compensa-
tion based on the number of cubic yards 
of earth moved or square yards compacted 
rather than on the period of time during 
which defendant had use of the equipment, 
and the rental term was the time required 
to do the work called for by the state con-
tracts. Testimony indicated that plaintiff 
furnished and retained control over both 
operating and supervisory employees, that 
it moved equipment to and from other jobs 
without defendant's consent, and that it 
carried on the work under both subcon-
tracts and rental agreements with the same 
I. It also purports to appeal from an or-
der denying a new trial. Such an or-
der la not appealable, but may be re-
personnel, equipment, and accounting. De-
fendant paid wages, payroll taxes, and com-
pensation insurance for employees operat-
ing the machines, but these costs were 
charged against amounts owing plaintiff 
under the rental agreements and so ulti-
mately were borne by it. Monthly progress 
reports from defendant to plaintiff were 
on a single form and made no segregation 
between charges attributable to work under 
the rental agreements and charges attribu-
table to work under the subcontracts. The 
evidence, especially the testimony of Stan-
ley Ball, tended to show that for all prac-
tical purposes the work was conducted by 
plaintiff, and that defendant exercised only 
such control as was necessary to coordinate 
the various subcontractors working on the 
parkway. 
[2] The trial court concluded that plain-
tiff had agreed to act and had in fact acted 
as a contractor within the meaning of sec-
tion 7026 of the Business and Professions 
Code, and that because it had done so with-
out the license required by section 7028, it 
was barred by section 7031 from maintain-
ing any action for compensation. Lewis 
"had an individual license, but neither 
Queen nor the partnership of Lewis and 
Queen had licenses. The court held, in 
the alternative, that the rental agreements 
were unenforceable because they violated 
the provisions in the state contracts against 
subcontracting more than a certain amount 
of the total work. Since we have concluded 
that plaintiffs failure to obtain a license 
prevented it from maintaining any action 
for compensation, we have no cause to con-
sider this alternative ground. The court 
entered judgment for defendant on the 
complaint and for plaintiff on the cross-
complaint. Plaintiff appeals from the judg-
ment against it.1 
Section 7028 of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code makes it unlawful for "any 
person to engage in the business or act in 
the capacity of a contractor within this 
viewed on an appeal from a judgment 
Code Civ.Proc. § 956. 
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State without having a license therefor 
* * *." Section 7026 defines a contractor 
as "any person, who * * * does himself 
or by or through others construct, alter, 
repair, add to, subtract from, improve, 
move, wreck or demolish any building, high-
way, road * * * or improvement 
* * *." "The term contractor includes 
subcontractor * * *." Section 7030 
rnakes it a misdemeanor for any person to 
act in the capacity of a contractor without 
a license. Section 7031 provides that, "No 
person engaged in the business or acting in 
the capacity of a contractor, may bring or 
maintain any action in any court of this 
State for the collection of compensation 
for the performance of any act or contract 
for which a license is required by this 
chapter without alleging and proving that 
he was a duly licensed contractor at all 
times during the performance of such act 
or contract." 
Furthermore, section 7025 states that the 
"person" required to have a license by sec-
tion 7028 includes a partnership, and sec* 
tion 7029 makes it unlawful for two in* 
dividuals, "each of whom has been issued 
a license to engage separately in the busi-
ness * * * of a contractor * * * to 
jointly * * * act in the capacity of a 
contractor * * * without first having 
secured an additional license for acting in 
the capacity of such a joint venture or 
combination * * *." 
[3] The evidence shows that in spite of 
the form of the rental agreements plaintiff 
actually undertook to and did in fact "con-
struct a highway" for defendant, and there-
by acted as a contractor within the meaning 
of section 7026. See Albaugh v. Moss 
Const. Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132-133, 
269 P.2d 936; Phillips v. Mcintosh, 51 Cal. 
App.2d 340, 343, 124 P.2d 835; cf. Harrison 
v. Shamalian, 110 Cal.App.2d 500, 243 P.2d 
S2; Andrew v. Conner, 101 Cal.App.2d 621, 
225 P.2d 943. 
[4,5] Plaintiff contends, however, that 
because defendant admitted in its answer 
that equipment had been furnished under 
the written rental agreements, the trial court 
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was precluded from finding that the actual 
agreements were subcontracts because it 
should have restricted its findings to the 
issues made by the pleadings. There is 
no merit in this contention. Whatever 
the state of the pleadings, when the evi-
dence shows that the plaintiff in substance 
seeks to enforce an illegal contract or re-
cover compensation for an illegal act, the 
court has both the power and duty to as-
certain the true facts in order that it may 
not unwittingly lend its assistance to the 
consummation or encouragement of what 
public policy forbids. Wells v. Comstock, 
46 CaUd 528, 532, 297 P.2d 961; Franklin 
v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 
629, 204 P.2d 37; Fewel & Dawes, Inc., v. 
Pratt, 17 Cal2d 85, 92, 109 P.2d 650; Endi-
cott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 728, 16 P.2d 
673; Tevis v. Blanchard, 122 Cal.App.2d 
731, 732-734, 266 P.2d 85; see Owens v. 
Haslett, 98 Ca!.App.2d 829, 835-836, 221 
P.2d 252. It is immaterial that the parties, 
whether by inadvertence or consent, even 
at the trial do not raise the issue- The 
court may do so of its own motion when 
the testimony produces evidence of illegal-
ity. Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal.App.2d 276, 
277-278, 282, 209 P.2d 24. It is not too 
late to raise the issue on motion for new 
trial, Pacific Wharf & Storage Co. v. 
Standard American Dredging Co., 184 Gal. 
21, 23-24, 192 P. 847, in a proceeding to' 
enforce an arbitration award, Franklin v. 
Nat C Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal2d 628, 
629, 204 P.2d 37, or even on appeal. Morey 
v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 733-734, 203 P. 
760. In the present case the issue was in 
fact raised during the trial. 
[6-8] Equally without merit is plaintiffs 
contention that because the rental agree-
ments stated that they contained all pro-
visions agreed to by the parties, the parol 
evidence rule precluded the admission of 
other evidence showing the true nature of 
the agreement between the parties and that 
plaintiff had in fact acted as a contractor. 
The parol evidence rule does not exclude 
evidence showing that a contract lawful 
on its face is in fact part of an illegal trans-
action. Code Civ.Proc. § 1856; Endicott 
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v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 728, 16 P.2d 673; 
May v. Herron, 127 Cal.App.2d 707, 710-
711, 274 R2d 484; Kennerson v. Salih 
Brothers, 123 Cal.App.2d 371, 374, 266 P.2d 
871; De Armas v. Dickerman, 108 Cal.App. 
2d 548, 551-552, 239 P.2d 65. The policy in 
favor of narrowing the issues in dispute, 
which normally confines the court to those 
made by the pleadings, and the policy of 
the parol evidence rule favoring the con-
clusiveness of integrated written agree-
ments, both give way before the importance 
of discouraging illegal conduct. To this 
end, the trial court must be free to search 
out illegality lying behind the forms in 
which the parties have cast the transaction 
to conceal such illegality. 
Plaintiff contends that even if it acted 
as a contractor under section 7026, it sub-
stantially complied with* the requirement 
of section 7028, since Lewis held an in-
dividual license. The "person" that did the 
contracting work, and was required by 
section 7028 to have a license, however, was 
the partnership of Lewis and Queen, and 
it had no license. Nor did Queen individu-
ally. Section 7029, furthermore, expressly 
requires individual licensees who engage 
jointly in'the contracting business to obtain 
an additional joint license. Cf. Joeph V. 
Drew, 36 Cal.2d 575, 578, 225 P.2d 504; 
Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.App. 765, 773, 242 P. 
90. 
Undoubtedly there are situations in which 
substantial compliance with the licensing 
requirements satisfies the policy
 r of the 
statute. See Gatti v. Highland Park Build-
ers, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 687, 689-694, 166 P.2d 
265; Citizens State Bank of Long Beach v. 
Gentry, 20 Cal.App.2d 415, • 419-420, 67 
P.2d 364; ci. Oddo v. Htdde, 101 CaLApp. 
2d 375, 225 P.2d 929. The facts of the 
present case, however, with one partner 
licensed individually and no partnership 
license, are precisely those in Loving & 
Evans v. Blick, 33 Ca!.2d 603, 204 P.2d 
23, 25, and in that case we said, "There 
can be no question but that this case pre-
sents a clear violation of the statutes regu-
lating the contracting business." 33 Cal.2d 
at page 607, 204 P.2d at page 25; see also 
Kirman v. Borzage, 65 Cal.App.2d 156, 
158-159, 150 P.2d 3 ; Holm v. Bramwell, 
20 Cal.App.2a 332, 335-336, 67 P.2d 114. 
We distinguished Gatti v. Highland Park 
Builders, Inc., supra, on the ground that 
there both partners held individual licenses 
and during the performance of the contract 
a joint license was issued to them and a 
third person, and Citizens State Bank of 
Long Beach v. Gentry, supra, on the ground 
that in that case, although the plaintiff's 
license expired while the work was in prog-
ress, it was renewed in the name of a cor-
poration controlled by him. 
[9-11] In both the Gatti and Gentry 
cases, any matter that might have formed 
the subject of inquiry by the licensing 
board in determining whether to issue an 
additional license was necessarily consider-
ed in connection with the licenses actually 
issued. In the present case, however, the 
board has never determined the qualifica-
tions of Queen. Plaintiff claims that this 
makes no difference, because it was Lewis 
who supervised the actual construction 
work and Queen merely kept the books and 
sought out new business for the partner-
ship. But the statutory provisions setting 
forth the qualifications for a license, and 
the causes for disciplinary action against 
licensees, show that the Legislature was as 
much concerned to protect the public from 
dishonesty and incompetence in the ad-
ministration of the contracting business as 
in the actual use of bricks, mortar, and 
earth-moving equipment. E.g., §§ 7068, 
7069, 7120. Plaintiff's insistence that Queen 
knew nothing about actual construction sim-
ply emphasizes the importance of the 
board's passing on his qualifications to en-
gage m any aspect oi the contracting busi-
ness. The statute makes it clear, further-
more that if the contractor is a partnership, 
the experience, knowledge, and integrity 
of each partner is a vital consideration in 
determining whether to issue a license. 
E.g., §§ 7067, 7069, 7071. Finally, it is not 
clear that Queen's activities were in fact 
confined to bookkeeping and the search 
for new business. He participated with 
Lewis in the negotiations that led to the 
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execution of the contracts, and he "walked 
the job," apparently to determine what 
problems would be encountered if the work 
was undertaken. The conclusion is ines-
capable that plaintiff did not substantially 
comply with the licensing requirements. 
Since plaintiff did not comply with the 
statute, it cannot "bring or maintain any 
action in any court of this State for the 
collection of compensation * * V § 
7031; Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 
603, 204 P.2d 23. Plaintiff contends, never-
theless, that because defendant has been 
paid in full by the state for all work done 
on the parkway, justice requires that it be 
compelled to turn over to plaintiff the pro-
ceeds from the state contracts attributable 
to plaintiffs labor. 
[12] One answer to this contention 
is that, even in the absence of a provision 
such as section 7031, the courts generally 
will not enforce an illegal bargain or 
lend their assistance to a party who seeks 
compensation for an illegal act. The rea-
son for this refusal is not that the courts 
are unaware of possible injustice between 
the parties, and that the defendant may 
be left in possession of some benefit he 
should in good conscience turn over to 
the plaintiff, but that this consideration is 
outweighed by the importance of deterring 
illegal conduct. Knowing that they will 
receive no help from the courts and must 
trust completely to each other's good faith, 
the parties are less likely to enter an il-
legal arrangement in the first place. See 
Takeuchi v. Schmuck, 206 Cal. 782, 786-
7%7t 276 P. 345; May v. Herron, 127 Cal. 
App.2d 707, 712, 274 P.2d 484; Orlinoff 
v. Campbell, 91 Cal.App.2d 382, 388, 205 
P.2d 67; Wise v. Radis. 74 Cal.App. 765, 
77%, 242 P. 90; Grodecki, In Pari Delicto 
Potior Est Conditio Defendentis, 71 L.Q. 
Rev. 254, 266-268. 
[13,14] In some cases, on the other 
hand, the statute making the conduct illegal, 
in providing for a fine or administrative 
discipline excludes by implication the ad-
ditional penalty involved in holding the il-
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legal contract unenforceable; or effective 
deterrence is best realized by enforcing 
the plaintiffs claim rather than leaving 
the defendant in possession of the benefit; 
or the forfeiture resulting from unen-
forceability is disproportionately harsh con-
sidering the nature of the illegality. In 
each such case, how the aims of policy 
can best be achieved depends on the kind 
of illegality and the particular facts in-
volved. See Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal. 
App.2d 472, 481-482, 267 P.2d 59; John 
E. Rosasco Creameries, Inc., v. Cohen, 276 
N.Y. 274, 278-280, 11 N.E.2d 908, 118 A.L. 
R. 641; 6 Corbin, Contracts 964-967 
(1951); 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence 
137 (5th ed. 1941); Grodecki, In Pari De-
licto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis, 71 
L.Q.Rev. 254, 268. But we are not free 
to weigh these considerations in the pres-
ent case. Section 7031 represents a legis-
lative determination that the importance 
of deterring unlicensed persons from en-
gaging in the contracting business out-
weighs any harshness between the parties, 
and that such deterrence can best be real-
ized by denying violators the right to main-
tain any action for compensation in the 
courts of the state. Kirman v. Borzage, 
65 Cal.App.2d 156, 158, 150 PJ2d 3. More-
over, even if we could take into account 
unjust enrichment of defendant, it is not 
at all clear that, had it reached the issue, 
the trial Court would have found defend-
ant indebted to plaintiff beyond what it 
had already paid. 
Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal.App2d 276, 209 
P.2d 24, Galich v. Brkich, 103 Cal A pp. 
2d 187, 229 P.2d 89, and Wold v. Luigi Con-
sentino & Sons, 109 Cal.App.2d 854, 241 
P.2d 1032, do not support plaintiffs right 
to recover. Each of those cases involved 
an action by a partner or joint venturer 
to recover a share of profits arising from 
an illegal enterprise. It was held that, 
since the enterprise was terminated, since 
it was not illegal as such but only for want 
of a license, and since the action was not 
against a third person for whose pro-
tection the statute had been primarily 
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enacted but against a partner or joint 
venturer, the purpose of the law would 
not be served by denying relief. We need 
not decide at this time whether an action 
for an accounting against a partner or 
joint venturer is "an action * * * for 
the collection of compensation" within 
section 7031, cf. Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal. 
App. 765, 775, 242 P. 90, or, even if it is 
not, whether the indirect encouragement 
of an illegal enterprise resulting from the 
allowance of such an action is sufficient to 
outweigh the evil of unjust enrichment 
See Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal.App.2d 570, 
575-578, 184 P.2d 688; 32 A.L.R.2d 1345, 
1387; Wade, Restitution of Benefits Ac-
quired Through Illegal Transactions, 95 
U.Pa.L.Rev. 261, 294-296; but see Den-
ning v. Taber, 70 CalApp.2d 253, 257-260, 
160 P.2d 900. The present action is 
against a third party, and is to enforce di-
rectly an illegal contract not merely to 
obtain an accounting for profits arising 
from one. As Norwood v. Judd itself 
recognizes, this situation falls squarely 
within section 7031. 93 Cal.App.2d 276, 
283, 209 P.2d 24. 
Plaintiff next contends that, by virtue of 
the fact that it is a subcontractor suing a 
general contractor rather than a general 
contractor suing an owner, neither section 
7031 nor the general rule that illegal con-
tracts are unenforceable bars its action. 
Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal.App.2d 821, 281 
P.2d 524, appears* to make this distinction 
decisive. In that case the Crane Service 
Company and the defendants, all unlicens-
ed contractors, decided to undertake the 
demolition of buildings for a school dis-
trict. The understanding between Crane 
and the defendants was that Crane would 
make the bid and defendants supply the 
funds to pay the school district; that the 
defendants would then do the actual work 
of taking down the bricks, using for this 
purpose Crane's machines, for which a 
reasonable rental would be paid; the de-
fendants would pay Crane for removing 
concrete and rough-grading the site, and 
all salvageable material would belong to 
the defendants. After the job was com-
pleted and the defendants had received all 
the revenues from the sale of salvage, they 
refused to pay Crane. Crane's assignee 
sued to enforce the contract. 
The district court of appeal held that 
the plaintiff could recover in spite of sec-
tion 7031. The first ground of its decision 
appears to be that, unless the plaintiff was 
allowed to recover the defendants would 
be unjustly enriched. As we have already 
pointed out, the courts may not resort to 
equitable considerations in defiance of 
section 7031. As an alternative ground, 
the court reasoned that Crane had in ef-
fect assigned the school district contract 
to defendants and then become their sub-
contractor; that subcontractors are in a 
class for whose protection the licensing 
statute was enacted (relying on our state-
ment in Fraenkel v. Bank of America, 40 
Cal.2d 845, 848, 256 P.2d 569, that the 
statute was designed "for the prevention 
of fraudulent acts by contractors result-
ing in loss to subcontractors, materialmen, 
employees, and owners of structures"); 
and that therefore a subcontractor can 
maintain an action on a contract with a 
general contractor, even though it is an 
illegal contract, because the subcontractor 
is not considered in pari delicto. 131 Cal. 
App.2d at page 829, 281 P2d at page 526. 
[15] It is true that when the Legisla-
ture enacts a statute forbidding certain 
conduct for the purpose of protecting one 
class of persons from the activities of an-
other, a member of the protected class may 
maintain an action notwithstanding the 
fact that he has shared in the illegal trans-
action. The protective purpose of the 
legislation is realized by allowing the 
plaintiff to maintain his action against a 
defendant within the class primarily to be 
deterred. In this situation it is said that 
the plaintiff is not in pari delicto. Carter 
v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 CaL2d 564, 
574, 203 P.2d 758; McAllister v. Drapeau, 
14 Cal.2d 102, 112, 92 P.2d 911, 125 A.L.R. 
800; Pollak v. Staunton, 210 Cal. 656, 662-
663, 293 P. 26; Elmers v. Shapiro, 91 Cal. 
App.2d 741, 754, 205 P.2d 1052; see Gro-
decki, In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio 
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Defendentis, 71 L.Q.Rev. 254, 265; Wade, 
Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through 
Illegal Transactions, 95 U.Pa.L.Rev. 261, 
268-270. 
[16,17] But subcontractors are not 
always in the class to be protected simply 
because they are subcontractors, and we 
did not suggest otherwise in Fraenkel v. 
Bank of America, 40 Cal.2d 845, 848, 256 
P.2d 569. See Albaugh v. Moss Const 
Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132, 269 P.2d 936; 
Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 67 
P.2d 114. The class protected by the stat-
ute includes those who deal with a person 
required by the statute to have a license. 
When the person required to have a li-
cense is a general contractor, then the pro-
tected class includes subcontractors, ma-
terialmen, employees, and owners dealing 
with the general contractor. However, 
when the person who was required to have 
a license but did not have one is himself 
a subcontractor, such as plaintiff in the 
present case, he of course is not to be pro-
tected from his own unlicensed activities. 
To allow him to recover would in fact de-
stroy the protection of those who dealt 
with him, and they are in the class the 
Legislature intended to protect whether 
they are owners or general contractors. 
Cf. Hedlund v. Sutter Medical Service 
Co., 51 Cal.App.2d 327, 333, 124 P.2d 878; 
2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 142 (5th 
ed. 1941). To the extent that it is con-
trary, the reasoning of Matchett v. Gould, 
131 Cal.App.2d 821, 281 P.2d 524, is er-
roneous and is disapproved. Under the 
facts of the present case plaintiff is not in 
the class to be protected, and therefore, is 
not relieved from the imputation of being 
in pari delicto. Its failure to obtain a li-
cense, and not any fault of defendant in 
this regard, made the transaction illegal. 
[18] There is no merit in plaintiffs 
further contention that it may maintain 
this action simply because it is an action 
against a licensed member of plaintiffs 
own profession, rather than against the 
owner for whose ultimate benefit the work 
was done. General contractors as much 
308 P.2d—46 
as owners are entitled to raise the defense 
of lack of a license in the subcontractor. 
If they were not, section 7031 would be 
no deterrent to subcontractors, since they 
generally do look to the general contractor 
for compensation. Yet section 7026, stating 
that "the term contractor includes subcon-
tractor," clearly imposes on unlicensed sub-
contractors the same disabilities as on un-
licensed general contractors. Cases from 
other jurisdictions cited by plaintiff, e. 
g., Dow v. United States, for Use and Bene-
fit of HoJJey, 10 Cir., 154 F.2d 707, 710, 
do not involve statutory prohibitions like 
section 7031. 
[19] Plaintiffs final contention is that, 
even if it cannot recover on the rental 
agreements from defendant, the defense of 
lack of a license is not available to the 
sureties on the bonds. Section 7031 pro-
vides, however, that no person who acts as 
a contractor "may bring or maintain any 
action * * * for the collection of com-
pensation for the performance of any act 
* * * " for which a license is required, 
without alleging and proving that he was 
licensed. (Italics added.) We have al-
ready held that an action to enforce an 
arbitration award is an action within the 
meaning of this provision, Loving & Evans 
v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 613, 204 P.2d 23; 
Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 
Cal.2d 628, 631-633, 204 P2d 37, and it is 
clear that an action to foreclose a me-
chanic's lien is also. Albaugh v. Moss 
Const Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132, 269 
P.2d 936; Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal.App.2d 
233, 237, 196 P.2d 585; Siemens v. Meconi, 
44 CaI.App.2d 641, 112 P.2d 904; Holm v. 
Bramwell, 20 CalApp^d 332, 334, 67 P.2d 
114. In view of the purpose of section 
7031, we can see no reason to distinguish 
an action on a bond. In all of these cases 
the object of the plaintiff is to obtain, more 
or hss directly, compensation for unli-
censed work. The deterrent purpose be-
hind section 7031 would be frustrated if 
the plaintiff, prevented from obtaining 
compensation directly by an action on his 
contract, could obtain it indirectly by an 
action on a bond. 
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[20,21] Moreover, even in the absence 
of section 7031, the defense of illegality is 
available to the surety if it is available to 
his principal. Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal. 
2d 528, 529, 533, 297 P.2d 961; Restate-
ment, Security § 117, comment d. Lewis 
& Queen v. S. Edmondson & Sons, 113 
Cal.App.2d 705, 707-708, 248 P.2d 973, and 
Pneucrete Corp. v. United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co., 7 Cal.App.2d 733, 736-
740, 46 P.2d 1000, which are cited by plain-
tiff, in spite of broad language in the opin-
ions do not hold otherwise. The obligation 
of the sureties on defendant's bonds was 
not to pay for labor merely by virtue of 
the fact that it had been expended on the 
parkway. It was an obligation to pay 
only if plaintiff established, without ref-
erence to the bond, a legal and valid claim 
for compensation. See Civil Code, § 2810; 
Flickinger v. Swedlow Engineering Co., 
45 Cal.2d 388, 393-394, 289 P.2d 214; Re-
statement, Security § 117, comment c, 
This plaintiff has not done. 
Appeal from order denying motion for 
new trial dismissed. Judgment affirmed. 




In my opinion, the strict construction 
placed upon Business and Professions Code 
sections, particularly section 7031, by the 
majority is unwarranted. Section 7031 is 
but a statutory declaration of the common 
law rule that a contract which violates a 
statute designated for the protection of the 
public is void and unenforceable. Levinson 
v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185, 88 P . S25, 12 L.R.A., 
N.S., 575; Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 
119, 57 P. 777, 45 L.R.A. 420; 12 Am.Jur., 
Contracts, § 158, p. 652. This rule, how-
ever, is not applied where to do so does not 
serve the intended purpose of the statute. 
Wilson v. Steams, 123 Cal.App2d 472, 478, 
267 P.2d 59, citing Harris v. Runnels, 12 
How. 79, 13 L.Ed. 901; 12 Am.Jur., Con-
tracts, § 162. p. 657. At one time in this 
state, statutes, such as section 7031, which 
expressly deny the enforcement of contracts 
which violate a particular law, were strictly 
construed to prevent recovery. See, e. g., 
Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.App. 765, 242 P. 90, 
involving a statute which prevented the en-
forcement of certain contracts by unlicensed 
real estate brokers. More recently, how-
ever, section 7031, although literally ap-
plicable, has not been applied where en-
forcement of the contract was considered 
not to be adverse to the public interest 
sought to be protected by the pertinent Busi-
ness and Professions Code sections. Gatti 
v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 
687, 166 P.2d 265; Citizens State Bank v. 
Gentry, 20 CaLApp.2d 415, 67 P.2d 364; 
Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal.App.2d 276, 209 
P.2d 24; Galich v. Brkich, 103 Cal.App.2d 
187, 229 P.2d 89; Wold v. Luigi Consentino 
& Sons, 109 Cal.App.2d 854, 241 P.2d 1032; 
Matchett v. Goxrid, 131 Cal.App.2d 821, 281 
P.2d 524. The effect of these cases is that 
the common law exceptions to the rule are 
recognized as being preferable to a strict, 
literal construction of the statutory lan-
guage. Accordingly, the conclusion of the 
majority—that because plaintiff is within 
the statutory definition (subcontractor) and 
seeks recovery of his share of the proceeds 
arising from the work, it necessarily fol-
lows that recovery must be denied—is based 
upon an incomplete analysis of the question 
presented. Rather, an examination should 
be made to determine whether the intended 
statutory purpose requires the denial of 
enforcement of this particular contract. 
Such an examination, it is submitted, 
demonstrates that the statute was not so 
intended. 
The facts of this case are quite similar 
to those in Norwood v. Judd, supia. TheTe, 
plaintiff and defendant had formed a 
partnership to conduct a contracting busi-
ness. Defendant was a duly licensed con-
tractor but neither plaintiff nor the partner-
ship was. Plaintiff brought an action to 
recover his share of the business proceeds 
from his partner. Literally, Business and 
Professions Code, section 7031, would have 
barred plaintiffs action as it provides, in 
part, that : "No person engaged in the 
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business or acting in the capacity of
 a 
/^tractor, may brinjr or maintain ajjy 
action * * * for the collection of cor .^ 
pensation for the performance of any act 
or contract for which a license is require 
by this chapter without alleging and prov-
ing that he was a duly licensed contractor 
at all tunes during the performance of su^h 
act or contract." However, recovery w^s 
allowed and the court declared, 93 Cal App# 
2d at page 286, 209 P2d at page 30 th*t 
"It must be remembered that these licensing 
statutes are passed primarily for the pr^. 
tection and safety of the public They a**e 
not passed lor the benefit of a greecjy 
partner who seeks to keep for himself %[\ 
of the fruits of the partnership enterprise 
to the exclusion of another partner e^. 
titled to share therein. Where the illegal 
transaction has been' terminated, publjc 
policy is not protected or served by denying 
one partner relief against the other/' J^  
was further not eof, 93 C&CApp 2d at page 
288, 209 P.2d 24, that Wise v. Radis, supr^ 
(applying the strict rule of construction) 
had been overruled in legal effect. D^. 
fendant's petition for a hearing in the No*, 
wooji case was denied by this court. 
A similar problem was presented i^ 
Galich y. Brkich, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d 18># 
229 V3A $9. Plaintiff, apparently an vu\l 
licensed contractor, entered into a joi% 
venture, or partnership agreement with d*. 
fendant JNP license was obtained for th^ 
enterprise as required by Business an^ j 
Professions Code, section 7029. In allowing 
recovery by plaintiff of the money due hir^  
for the contracting work performed by tht 
venture, the court declared 103 Cal App 2$ 
at page 191, 229 P 2d at page 91, that "Th^ 
contract in question was not per se con. 
tr<£/y te *2?y steteie; pub))c 7re)l#se &?<$ 
safety were not threatened, and public 
policy would not be protected or -serveq 
by denying one partner relief against th^ 
other." Applying the reasoning of tht 
Norwood case, supra, the court observe^ 
that "* * * the rule that courts wil\ 
not lend their aid to the enforcement of aif 
illegal agreement should not be 'blindly' ex-
tended 'to every case where illegality ap-
pears somewhere in the transaction.' " De-
fendant's petition for a hearing in this court 
was denied. 
In Wold v. Luigi Consentino & Sons, 
supra, 109 Cal App 2d 854, 241 P2d 1032, 
the same problem was again presented. 
The application of the statute was rejected, 
the court declaring 109 Cal App2d at page 
857/241 P2d 1032; that its Win purpose 
was protection of owners. 
c Recovery was /allowed " in* these cases 
because the actions were not against those 
whom the statute was intended to protect, 
that is, an owner or other member oftthe 
general public who is without knowledge of 
or experience in contracting affairs, and 
hence, is wholly dependent upon the com-
petence of the contractor. Accordingly, the 
'statute wasrnot applied to allow a&associate 
of an unlicensed individual to retain the 
proceeds rightfully owing to the latter. It 
.seems clear that this principle is applicable 
herey despite the absence of a partnership 
or joint venture relationship/ for in practi-
cal effect, the circumstances are identical. 
Two parties agreed to perform work for a 
third party and one of the two has with-
* *
%
 the "other's share/ of the'pVoceeds. held X^t t 's s / f tn  
Upon' facts identical to tnose in the'fJresent 
case, the Second district Court of Appeal 
in Matchett v. Gould? supra, 
821, 281 P.2d 524, applied the principle of 
the partnership cases and allowed recovery. 
In that case, neither plaintiff, d subcon-
tractor, nor defendant, a general contractor, 
was licensed. Upon completion of a con-
tracting job for a third party, plaintiff 
sought the amount owing to him for the 
work performed. Analogizing to Norwood 
K. fuddr suprat the court allowed recovery 
and declared that the precise' relationship 
between the parties, that is, whether part-
ners or contractor' and subcontractor, was 
not determinative and that the statute was 
not intended to prevent recovery where the 
unlicensed contractor has completed the 
job, where there is no serious moral turpi-
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tude involved and where a denial of re-
covery would permit unjust enrichment of 
one not intended to be protected, namely, 
the general contractor. Citing Gatti v. 
Highland Park Builders, Inc., supra, 27 Cal. 
2d 687, 166 P.2d 265, the court observed 
131 Cal App 2d at page 829,281 P.2d at page 
529, that the statute was not intended as an 
" 'unwarranted shield for the avoidance of 
a just obligation.'" 
Here, the majority, to sustain their de-
cision that plaintiff is precluded from en* 
forcing his contract, concludes that the 
reasoning of Matchett v. Gould, supra, is 
erroneous, although a petition for hearing 
in that case was denied by this court. The 
majority opinion further declares that "To 
allow him [plaintiff] to recover would in 
fact destroy the protection of those who 
dealt with him, and they are, in the class 
the Legislature intended to protect wheth-
er they are owners or general contractors." 
What protection is to be afforded a general 
contractor? He is not in the position of a 
member of the public who desires con-
tracting work performed and because of the 
disparity of knowledge and experience is 
extended statutory protection. Rather, his 
position is equal to that of the subcontractor 
and he is, therefore, able to judge the nature 
and quality of the subcontractor's per-
formance for himself. If the statute was 
intended to "protect" a general contractor as 
a member of the public, as undeniably he is, 
then it should be applied to "protect," from 
one another, members of partnership which 
has illegally undertaken contracting work. 
It has been seen, however, that the statute 
is not construed in such a fashion. In the 
interests of just and consistent application, 
it should not be so construed here. For 
this reason, I would reverse the judgment 
and remand the case for a determination 
of the cause on its merits. 
SCHAUER, J., concurs. 
Rehearing denied; CARTER and 
SCHAUER, J J , dissenting. 
GIBSON, C. J., not participating. 
Felix BARRERA and Doleres Barrert, 
his wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Armondo A. DE LA TORRE, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
L. A. 23875. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
March 22, 1957. 
Action by dwelling owners against 
motorist for injuries to person and prop-
erty resulting when motorist's automobile 
struck dwelling. The Superior Court, Los 
Angeles County, Ellsworth Meyer, J., 
entered judgment on verdict for defendant, 
and owners appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Spence, J., held that question of motorist's 
negligence was for jury. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Carter, J., dissented. 
Opinion, 300 P.2d 100, vacated. 
1. Negligence <S=>I2I(2) 
For doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be 
applicable, the accident must be of kind 
which ordinarily does not occur in ab-
sence of negligence, must have been caused 
by an agency or instrumentality within de-
fendant's exclusive control, and must not 
have been due to any voluntary action or 
contribution on part of plaintiff, 
2. Appeal and Error <&=>2I6(I) 
Automobiles <£=>246(60) 
In action by dwelling owners against 
motorist for injuries to person and prop-
erty resulting when motorist's automobile 
struck dwelling, evidence would have war-
ranted instruction on doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, but owners, who had not request-
ed such instruction, could not argue on 
appeal that trial court erred in failing to 
givt a specific instruction thereon, 
3. Appeal and Error <§=>277 
Upon appeal from judgment for de-
fendant, plaintiffs, who had not complained 
